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Credit on Wheels: The Law and 
Business of Auto-Title Lending 
Jim Hawkins∗ 
Abstract 
Despite the fact that they are used by millions of Americans, 
auto-title loans have received little attention in the legal literature 
about consumer credit. Friends and foes of title lending make 
confident statements about their net welfare effects, but we still lack 
empirical data on many of the central policy questions that title 
lending raises. This Article offers new evidence about the title 
lending transaction, paying special attention to the risks borrowers 
face when they use their vehicles as collateral for the loan. I 
gathered this evidence by obtaining new reports from state 
regulators about the title lending industry, examining public 
disclosure statements by title lenders, interviewing title lenders, 
and surveying a small group of title lending customers. 
Additionally, the Article organizes the different legal responses to 
title lending, creating a taxonomy of regulatory approaches. Based 
on the new data uncovered by my research, I offer tentative 
evaluations of these diverse regulatory strategies. 
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I. Introduction 
As traditional sources of credit have become scarcer, more and 
more Americans are turning to alternative financial service 
providers when they need or want money.1 Some of these fringe 
banking firms take personal property as collateral for high-interest 
loans, while others tie small-dollar loan amounts to the borrower’s 
next paycheck. Another common fringe banking transaction, the 
                                                                                                     
 1. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY 
OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 10 (2009), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/executive_summary.pdf (finding that 
25.6% of U.S. households are unbanked or underbanked) [hereinafter FDIC 
SURVEY]. 
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auto-title loan, is a source of credit for millions of Americans but 
has not generated the same scholarly interest as pawn and payday 
loans.  
In an auto-title loan, a borrower typically takes out a one-
month loan at a high interest rate and gives a security interest to 
the lender in a vehicle that has no other liens on it.2 If the 
borrower defaults on the loan, the lender has the right to repossess 
and sell the collateral. It is not surprising that this transaction 
creates concern among policymakers because it involves people 
who are outside of the mainstream banking system, risking what 
is potentially their most valuable asset and their only means of 
transportation. 
Despite the important concerns that title lending raises, little 
empirical work has been done to understand the central questions 
policymakers need answered in order to craft optimal title lending 
laws.3 Additionally, states regulate title loans through many 
diverse approaches, but there are few legal analyses of the 
different mechanisms states use to govern title loans.  
This Article hopes to contribute to the research on title loans 
by tackling these two issues. First, in Part II, I offer new empirical 
evidence about the title lending transaction, paying special 
attention to the risks borrowers face when they use their vehicles 
as collateral for the loan. I gathered this evidence by obtaining new 
reports from state regulators about the title lending industry, 
examining public disclosure statements by title lenders, 
interviewing title lenders, and surveying a small group of title 
lending customers. 
Second, I organize the different legal responses to title lending 
in Part III, creating a taxonomy of regulatory approaches. States 
govern title loans by banning them, permitting them to operate 
despite usury limits through legal carve-outs such as pawnshop 
laws, and explicitly authorizing and regulating them through 
statutes geared directly at title lenders. 
                                                                                                     
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. Only two law review articles extensively take up the question of title 
lending. See Todd Zywicki, Consumer Use and Government Regulation of Title 
Pledge Lending, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 425, 426 (2010); Nathalie Martin & 
Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and Demographic 
Realities in Title Lending, 77 MO. L. REV. 41 (forthcoming 2012). 
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In light of the business realities of title lending and current 
regulatory strategies, Part III argues that the best approach to 
regulating title lending is for states to adopt laws specifically 
aimed at authorizing and regulating title loans. I offer several 
tentative suggestions for laws that are particularly important to 
protect consumers using title loans. For example, I urge states to 
adopt laws that require lenders to return surpluses from sales of 
collateral but restrict lenders from pursuing deficiencies. Also, I 
suggest laws that require plain disclosures of the cost of title loans 
and the risks of repossession and costly rollovers. In contrast, I 
find that laws aimed at setting limits on the amount a lender can 
loan or capping the amount a lender can charge as an interest rate 
likely harm the customers who are most vulnerable to injury from 
title lending. The main policy goal underlying many of my 
suggestions is to encourage lenders to offer higher loan amounts in 
exchange for the collateral pledged, thus protecting those 
borrowers who lose vehicles through repossession and risk losing 
the equity they have accumulated in their cars. The suggestions 
are tentative because many of the important empirical questions 
about title lending still require research. 
II. The Title Lending Business 
Many of the questions at the heart of the debate over title 
lending policy are empirical. This Part introduces new data about 
these pivotal issues. After discussing my research approach, I 
introduce new evidence about the transaction itself and the use of 
vehicles as collateral. 
A. Research Approach 
To gather new information on the title lending industry, I first 
collected and compiled data from state regulators who obtain 
information from title lenders pursuant to licensing laws. Some of 
these state reports are publicly available. The reports from 
Tennessee have been discussed in the past,4 but I also discovered 
                                                                                                     
 4. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 3, at 434 (discussing the size of title loans 
across the country); Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 68. 
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public reports from Virginia and Oregon, which have been 
overlooked in prior research. In addition to these publicly available 
reports, I obtained reports from Illinois through a request under 
the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, and from Montana and 
Idaho through informal requests to the individuals responsible for 
generating those states’ reports.5  
Second, I reviewed public disclosure filings by title lenders. 
Although there are few public companies doing title lending, I 
examined the bankruptcy filings and security re-characterization 
filings of TitleMax, one of the nation’s largest lenders, and also 
reviewed another public firm’s annual report. 
Third, I interviewed title lenders. I spoke with lenders from a 
variety of types of businesses—large lenders who do only title 
loans, large multi-line lenders, and small lenders. These 
interviews were conducted in person or over the phone. 
Finally, I attempted to survey title loan customers. I designed 
a survey instrument, reproduced in Appendix A, and trained two 
research assistants in administering the survey. These two 
research assistants spent more than fifty hours waiting for 
customers to enter stores at title lending locations throughout 
Houston, Texas. The research assistants varied the times and days 
of the week that they were at stores.  
When customers exited the title lending store, the research 
assistants approached them, explained the survey, and offered a 
$10 Target gift card as a thank you for completing the survey. 
Everyone approached was given an informed consent handout, and 
the study was approved by the University of Houston’s Committee 
for the Protection of Human Subjects. The response rate was 
64.82%, but overall only thirty-five people completed the survey. 
Several things prevented a larger number of customers from 
participating in the survey. Importantly, most stores did not have 
many customers come in each day. Some stores had only one or 
two people over a three-hour time period. Others had no customers 
during a three-hour period. Additionally, it was difficult to 
determine when the stores would be busy because, unlike payday 
                                                                                                     
 5. New Mexico also produces a report about title lending, but Martin and 
Adams present this data in extensive detail so I do not discuss it here other than 
to highlight my different interpretations of those reports. See generally Martin 
& Adams, supra note 3. 
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loans that are tied to a pay period,6 title loans can be originated on 
any day of the month. We had the most success at a single store, 
Lone Star Title Loans, simply because it was a much busier store 
than any other location. A full 85.71% of the completed surveys 
came from this location, while the others came from a variety of 
other stores across Houston.7 
The survey results are obviously not representative of title 
lending customers generally, title lending customers in Texas, or 
even those in Houston. And, even if the results were 
representative, the sample size is problematically small. Thus, I 
present the information I obtained from the surveys merely as 
anecdotal evidence about title-lending customers, and I hope 
lessons learned from this survey attempt can inform future 
customer-based research about title lending. My only claim about 
the survey is that it represents the actual people we surveyed.  
B. The Title Loan Transaction 
Some of the important policy questions surrounding title 
lending relate to the transaction itself. In the traditional version of 
the product, title loans are one-month long loans, with the entire 
balance—principal and interest—due at the end of the month.8 If 
the borrower cannot pay the principal, the lender will allow an 
interest-only payment to roll the loan over for another month.9 
                                                                                                     
 6. Nathalie Martin surveyed payday lending customers using the same 
approach with more success by waiting outside stores on Fridays. She obtained 
results from 109 people. See Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While 
Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 
563, 597 (2010). 
 7. See JIM HAWKINS, SURVEY REPORT ON AUTO TITLE LENDING [hereinafter 
HAWKINS SURVEY] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 8. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 164–65 
(2004) (discussing the title loan process). 
 9. See Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer 
Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge 
to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. 
REV. 589, 598–600 (2000) (“Because auto-title loans routinely require repayment 
soon after the transaction is completed, many customers cannot make the full 
principal and interest payment when it comes due. As a result, the loan is often 
extended for another fee (some contracts allow the lender to do so 
unilaterally).”). 
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To obtain the loan, the lender usually requires the borrower to 
bring a clear title to the vehicle, the actual vehicle, identification, 
names of references, and sometimes proof of income.10 In a process 
that takes twenty to forty minutes, the lender evaluates the value 
of the vehicle, often through the use of commercial guides or 
proprietary software.11 
1. Why Do People Take out Title Loans? 
The reasons people use title loans have enormous policy 
implications. If a significant percentage of title loans fuel small 
business growth, banning the transaction could hamper job 
creation in the midst of a recession. Also, if title loans allow lower 
income Americans to overcome emergency situations like 
unexpected medical expenses or car repairs, they serve an 
important social function. However, a trenchant argument against 
title lending has been that it only delays inevitable financial 
breakdowns because people use the loan to pay for normal 
expenses.12 As it turns out, there is evidence of each of these uses: 
business expenses, emergency expenses, and normal expenses. 
A couple of studies have documented the reasons people take 
out title loans. An FDIC survey of unbanked and underbanked 
households asked individuals about why they use fringe credit 
products, including pawn loans, payday loans, and rent-to-own.13 
Although it did not ask about title loans, the results are still 
relevant because the customer base is similar. The FDIC found 
that 38% of people used credit from alternative financial service 
providers for basic living expenses, 15.4% used it to make up for 
                                                                                                     
 10. For one example of these requirements, see Advantage Finance, LLC, 
Application For Title Loan in Houston, TX, http://www.cartitleloans 
houston.com/pages/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (discussing criteria the 
company will consider in assessing loan applications) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. See TMX Finance, LLC (Form S-4) (Apr. 19, 2011) at 29 (discussing 
valuation formulae using the Black Book) [hereinafter TMX Finance]; id. at 43 
(noting the average time to complete a loan transaction). 
 12. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 9, at 599 (observing that title lending 
“can create a ‘debt treadmill’ or downward spiral effect that is at the root of 
much of the concern about cash lending in the fringe market”). 
 13.  See FDIC SURVEY, supra note 1, at 42 (providing empirical evidence for 
the reasons consumers use fringe credit products). 
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lost income, 7.4% used it for house repairs or purchasing an 
appliance, 6.2% used it for special gifts or luxuries, 4.5% used it for 
car repairs, 2.3% used it for medical expenses, and 26.3% used it 
for other reasons.14  
I did uncover one survey specifically aimed at title lending 
customers, prepared by a large title lender who provided it to me 
on condition of anonymity. In 2007, the lender’s customers in New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Kansas, Virginia, and Oregon completed 
surveys in conjunction with taking out loans.15 The lender gave 
participants a $20 loan coupon in exchange for completing the 
survey. The lender compiled the data by state into a report.16 In 
Table 1, I aggregate that data and summarize the results when the 
lender asked what the “[n]eed for loan was caused by.” 
Table 1: Title Lender Survey on Reasons Customers Took Out 
Loan 
Reason Percentage of Borrowers17 Number 
Car maintenance/repair 29.18% 314 
Unusually high utility bill 19.33% 208 
Help with mortgage/rent 28.90% 311 
Unexpected medical emergency 14.87% 160 
Delay in payment of expected 
income/missed paycheck 29.55% 318 
Other 8.74% 94 
These lists of reasons include both emergency expenses 
(roughly 14.2%–29.6% in the FDIC’s survey18 and 92.93% in the 
                                                                                                     
 14. Id.  
 15. See ANONYMOUS LENDER SURVEY 1 (2007) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review) [hereinafter LENDER SURVEY]. 
 16. I obviously am taking this data at face value. I was not involved in 
designing or administering the survey, so I do not have information about its 
research design, how it was conducted, or the response rate, beyond the details I 
have presented here. 
 17. To calculate the percentage of borrowers citing a reason, I added up all 
of the responses to another question about the borrower’s occupation and 
divided the reason for the loan by that number. The number of responses to the 
question about what need led to the loan was 1,405, but the total number of 
people providing an occupation was 1,076. Thus, it appears that some people 
listed multiple reasons for needing the loan, which explains why my percentages 
add up to more than 100%. 
 18. These numbers represent those stating their reasons as “house 
repairs,” “car repairs,” and “medical expenses” (equaling 14.2%) plus those 
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lender’s survey19) and regular expenses (roughly 38% in the FDIC’s 
survey20 and 28.09% in the lender’s survey21). Thus, the policy 
question is more difficult than just labeling the use of title loans as 
either purely emergency or purely routine spending. It appears to 
involve both.  
Another factor complicating any analysis of loan use is that 
people may report that they used the loan for one purpose when 
they in fact used it as spending money for other purposes. For 
instance, someone may claim to be using a loan to pay rent, but the 
person may only need the money because of gambling losses from 
earlier in the month. Without a comprehensive budget, survey 
data about loan use is difficult to assess. 
A similar ambiguity exists about whether a significant portion 
of loans is taken out for business reasons. Todd Zywicki reports 
from his interviews with industry members that title loans help 
small business owners who do not have ready access to traditional 
sources of credit and who plan to repay the debt quickly.22 Zywicki 
estimates that 25% to 30% of title lending customers fit into this 
category.23 People within the industry confirm that many title loan 
customers are small business owners who use their vehicles as a 
source of capital to operate their businesses.24 TitleMax’s securities 
                                                                                                     
stating their reason was “lost income” (15.4%), depending on whether one 
considers this to be an emergency expense or not.  See FDIC SURVEY, supra note 
1, at 43, 67 (compiling survey responses into Table A-20: Reasons Underbanked 
Households Use AFS Credit). 
 19. This number represents those stating their reasons as “car 
maintenance/repair,” “unusually high utility bill,” “unexpected medical 
emergency,” or “delay in payment of expected income/missed paycheck.” See 
LENDER SURVEY , supra note 15.  
 20. This number represents those stating that they needed the loan for 
“basic living expenses.” See FDIC SURVEY, supra note 1, at 43, 67.  
 21. This number represents those stating that they needed the loan for 
“help with mortgage/rent.” LENDER SURVEY, supra note 15, at 1.  
 22. See Zywicki, supra note 3, at 449 (“Many such businesses do not have 
access to small business loans and rely on consumer credit, such as credit cards, 
home equity loans, auto title loans, and other sources of consumer lending to 
finance their business operations.”).  
 23. Id. 
 24. See Interview with Anonymous Director of Government Affairs, Large 
Title Lending Company (Dec. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Anonymous Interview] 
(noting that the company only makes consumer loans but that “a significant 
percentage of our customer base owns their own business”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Interview with Tommy Davis, 
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filing states that customers are often “self-employed small 
business owners with an immediate need for short-term working 
capital.”25 Even a member of Congress has claimed that title loans 
can help save small businesses from failing.26 
In the anonymous title lender survey, 19.70% (n = 212) of 
customers identified themselves as self-employed.27 The lender, 
however, did not ask customers whether the loan was for business-
related or personal needs, so it is not clear whether these self-
employed customers were using the loan for business purposes. In 
listing the need that prompted the loan, very few customers listed 
expenses that look like business expenses. Four responses in the 
“Other Reasons” category were explicitly business-related: 
“Starting a new business,” “Down payment for new work truck,” 
“New business,” and “Purchase of Semi.” Additionally, other 
categories could have included business-related reasons, such as 
“Car maintenance/repair,” “Unusually high utility bill,” “Help with 
mortgage/rent,” and “Delay in payment of expected income/missed 
paycheck.”28  
In my survey, I asked borrowers whether they were taking out 
the title loan for “Business Expenses,” “Personal Expenses,” or a 
combination of the two. I clarified that “Personal Expenses” would 
include buying gas to get to work. Among those we surveyed, 
                                                                                                     
President & Justin Davis, Vice-President, TJD Financial Services, Inc. (Aug. 24, 
2011) [hereinafter Davis & Davis Interview] (estimating that 10% of their loans 
are for business purposes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Interview with Thomas Cone, General Manager, Magnolia Title Loans (Sept. 20, 
2011) [hereinafter Cone Interview] (estimating that 20% of his company’s loans 
are for business purposes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Dena Potter, Va. Car Title Lending Law Takes Effect Friday, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESS WEEK (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financial 
news/D9IHLNUO1.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“Scott Johnson, a lobbyist for 
title lender Community Loans of America, said . . . many borrowers are small 
business owners who rely on their vehicle for capitol [sic] in order to run their 
businesses.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 25. See TMX Finance, supra note 11, at 40. 
 26. See 146 CONG. REC. H5179-02 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of 
Rep. McCollum) (“This emergency credit can keep a small businessman from 
going under, or cover immediate needs at the end of the month.”). 
 27. See LENDER SURVEY, supra note 15, at 1. 
 28. Id.  
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25.71% (n = 9) said they were using the loan at least in part to run 
their own business.29 
2. How Much Money Do Stores Lend to Customers? 
How much money stores lend to borrowers plays an important 
role in several of the policy issues surrounding title lending. One 
concern is that title lending causes financial distress in allowing 
borrowers to take on excessive debt loads. Another perception is 
that title lenders strip equity from borrowers by lending them only 
a small percentage of the value of their vehicles. We can measure 
how much title lenders give to customers in a variety of ways: 
(1) the amount lent in absolute dollars, (2) the amount lent relative 
to the value of the vehicle, or (3) the amount lent relative to the 
borrower’s income. This section evaluates the data for each of these 
three measurements. 
a. Absolute Dollar Amounts 
There are several data points that reveal how much, in 
absolute dollars, title loan companies lend to customers. An 
earlier academic study reports that the average advance is 
$275.30 EZCORP, a public company that does title lending, states 
in its annual report that $700 is its average loan amount;31 
TitleMax states in a securities filing that “[o]ur customers borrow 
on average approximately $1,100 and $850 at our TitleMax and 
TitleBucks stores, respectively”;32 and one smaller Texas-based 
firm reported its average loan was for $1,000.33 State regulators 
report averages of $793.80 in Illinois,34 $562 in Montana,35 $847 
                                                                                                     
 29. See HAWKINS SURVEY, supra note 7, at 1.  
 30. See JOHN P. CASKEY, LOWER INCOME AMERICANS, HIGHER COST 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 46 (1997). 
 31. See EZCORP, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (Dec. 14, 2009) 
[hereinafter EZCORP, Inc.]. 
 32. See TMX Finance, supra note 11, at 41. 
 33. See Davis & Davis Interview, supra note 24, at 1. 
 34. See ILL. DEPT. OF FIN. & PROF. REG., PAYDAY LOAN CONSUMER REPORTING 
SERVICE, TITLE LOAN AGGREGATE DATA: OCTOBER 2009 THROUGH JUNE 2011 2 
[hereinafter ILLINOIS REPORT] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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in Virginia,36 and $243 in Oregon.37 The modal amount of a title 
loan (representing 40% of agreements) in Tennessee was $251–
$500.38  
Each of these data points reflects the laws in the jurisdictions 
reporting them. Oregon, for instance, limits lenders to charging an 
annual percentage rate (APR) of 36% but allows them to charge a 
one-time fee of $30, which appears to cause lenders to lend close to 
$300.39 Tennessee caps loans at $2,500,40 resulting in lower 
averages. I do not have data from California, but we would expect 
much higher loan averages there because lenders lend more than 
$2,500 to avoid usury limits.41 Thus, not only is a national average 
impossible, it is meaningless without the context of the state’s 
laws. 
While we may not be able to fix an exact amount as the 
standard title loan, the data does suggest that title loans are 
generally for small amounts. Martin and Adams have argued, 
however, that title “loans are by no means small.”42 As evidence, 
they point out that “[o]ne internet company offers loans of up to 
$50,000, and the New Mexico state data reflect loans up to 
                                                                                                     
Review). 
 35. See MONT. DIV. OF BANKING & FIN. INSTS., COMPOSITE REPORT OF 
OPERATIONS OF MONTANA TITLE LOAN LICENSEES: CALENDAR YEAR 2009 1 
[hereinafter 2009 MONTANA REPORT] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 36. See VA. STATE CORP. COMM., BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., THE 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE PAYDAY LENDER LICENSEES, CHECK CASHERS, MOTOR VEHICLE 
TITLE LENDER LICENSEES 84, available at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/bfi/annual/ 
ar04-10.pdf [hereinafter VIRGINIA REPORT]. 
 37. See OR. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AND BUS. SERVS., DIV. OF FIN. AND CORP. 
SEC., OREGON LICENSED CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.cbs.state.or.us/external/dfcs/cf/annual_reports/2009.pdf [hereinafter 
2009 OREGON REPORT]. 
 38. See TENN. DEP’T OF FIN. INST., 2010 REPORT ON THE TITLE PLEDGE 
INDUSTRY 6, available at http://www.tennessee.gov/tdfi/compliance/tpl/TPL 
Report2009Final.pdf [hereinafter 2010 TENN. REPORT]. 
 39. See OR. REV. STAT. § 725.622(1) (2007), repealed by Or. Laws Spec. 
Sess., ch. 23, § 34 (2010) (maintaining the 36% interest rate and allowing a one-
time fee for a new loan). 
 40. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-15-115(3) (2005) (setting limitations on title 
lenders).  
 41. See CAL FIN. CODE § 22303 (1995) (making interest rate restrictions 
inapplicable to any “bona fide principal amount” of $2,500 or more). 
 42. Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 48 n.37. 
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$42,000.”43 These single examples are hardly representative and, 
thus, provide poor evidence of what standard amounts may be. 
Aggregate data from Montana, for instance, indicates that only 
0.42% of loans in 2009 were for more than $4,000,44 while 97.41% 
of loans were for less than $2,000.45 In Tennessee, in 2008, “only 
3% were made for amounts between $2,251 and $2,500 which is 
the maximum loan amount permitted by law.”46 Thus, while it is 
difficult to make generalizations, it appears that title loans are 
often for low amounts.  
b. Money Lent Relative to the Value of the Vehicle 
In addition to measuring the absolute amount of title loans, 
we can also measure the amount lent in relation to the value of the 
vehicle. Again, different sources cite very different ratios, ranging 
from “about 25% of the wholesale value of the car”47 to 80% of the 
value of the vehicle.48 
Similarly, lenders I interviewed gave me a range of 
percentages for how much they will lend. One said it typically 
lends 50% of the wholesale value of the car;49 another said it lends 
33% to 80% of the Black Book50 value of the vehicle depending on 
the year and condition of the car;51 and yet another reported that it 
                                                                                                     
 43. Id. 
 44. This represents 53 loans of 12,727. 2009 MONTANA REPORT, supra note 
35, at 1.  
 45. This represents 12,397 of 12,727 loans. Id.  
 46. 2010 TENN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 6. 
 47. CASKEY, supra note 30, at 44. 
 48. See Webinar: Baby, You Can Take My Car: The Dangers of Auto Title 
Loans, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (July 15, 2010), http://www.nclc.org/images/ 
pdf/conferences_and_webinars/auto_webinars/recordings/recording_july15.wmv 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2012) [hereinafter NCLC Webinar] (remarks of Leslie 
Parrish, Senior Researcher for the Center of Responsible Lending) (reporting 
that she has seen loan-to-value ratios of 80%) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 49. Anonymous Interview, supra note 24. 
 50. The Black Book is a regularly published guide that provides the value 
of cars sold at auctions. See Black Book, Overview, http://www.blackbookusa. 
com/home.aspx?m=2&s=1&t=D&i=20 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 51. Interview with Robert Reich, President, Community Loans of America 
(Jan. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Reich Interview] (on file with the Washington and 
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lends 40% to 70% of the Kelly Bluebook wholesale value of a 
vehicle.52 Industry giant TitleMax went through a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy recently and, in a disclosure statement sent to 
creditors, stated, “Using the appraised value of the Vehicle, and 
based upon the customer’s need, the Debtors will lend up to 80% of 
the appraised value of a Vehicle.”53 TitleMax’s recent Form S-4 
goes into greater detail: 
Store managers appraise the wholesale value of the customer’s 
vehicle based on the following characteristics of the vehicle: 
year, make, model, exterior, interior and mechanical condition 
and mileage. One factor our managers consider in determining 
asset value is the most conservative wholesale value of the 
customer’s automobile listed in the Black Book, as opposed to 
the higher retail value listed in the Black Book (for the year 
ended December 31, 2010, the “rough” wholesale value amount 
was on average 64% less than the retail value amount). This 
reduces the overall risk of our title loans receivable by having 
more conservative loan to value ratios (at origination, our 
receivables had an approximately 69% weighted average loan to 
appraised wholesale value and an approximately 25% weighted 
average loan to Black Book retail value), which results in more 
security for each loan and less overall risk for our company.54 
Two puzzles emerge when we consider the relationship 
between the vehicle’s value and the loan’s amount. First, it is 
difficult to assess whether lenders are giving loans that are “too 
high” or “too low.” On the one hand, those concerned with 
borrowers’ ability to repay the loans complain that loan amounts 
are too high.55 On the other hand, those worried that borrowers 
lose equity when title lenders repossess consumers’ vehicles and do 
not return the surpluses argue that lenders do not lend sufficiently 
                                                                                                     
Lee Law Review). 
 52. See Interview with Alex Vaugh, Vice-President of Government 
Relations, Cash America, Inc., and Shawn Bourns, Director in Operations 
Development of Retail Service, Cash America, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2010) [hereinafter 
Vaugh & Bourns Interview] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53. Disclosure Statement for Plan of Reorganization of Titlemax Holdings, 
L.L.C., at 4–5, In re Titlemax Holdings, L.L.C., 447 B.R. 896 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
2010) (09–40805), ECF No. 390 [hereinafter Titlemax Disclosure Statement].     
 54. TMX Finance, supra note 11, at 42; see also id. at 29 (“At origination, 
our weighted average loan amount is approximately 69% of appraised wholesale 
value and approximately 25% of the Black Book retail value.”). 
 55. See infra Part III.A.1.c. 
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high percentages of the vehicles’ value.56 Moreover, research 
indicates that higher loan amounts may actually decrease the 
likelihood of default.57 
The second puzzle that emerges from considering the amount 
of the loan in relation to the vehicle is whether title loans are 
oversecured or undersecured. The common wisdom is that title 
loans are oversecured, or at least fully secured, so lenders are 
taking essentially no risk in lending money.58 More pointedly, 
members of Congress and others claim that lenders benefit when 
they repossess and sell vehicles because they retain the surplus 
from the transaction.59 Yet another common charge against title 
                                                                                                     
 56. See 146 CONG. REC. H5179-02 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of 
Rep. Mascara). 
 57. See Will Dobbie & Paige Marta Skiba, Information Asymmetries in 
Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from Payday Lending 2 (Vanderbilt Univ. 
Sch. of Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 11-05, 2011)  (“Our regression 
discontinuity estimates suggest that a $100 increase in loan size decreases the 
probability that a borrower defaults by 2.8 to 3.8 percentage points. This is a 22 
to 35 percent decrease from the mean default rate.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Colleen Creamer, Payday Loans: 
Taking the Good with the Bad, 35 NASHVILLE LEDGER 33 (2011) (“I think that 
raising the limit actually may be a good thing for borrowers . . . . [W]hen people 
are allowed to borrow larger amounts, it actually helps them to repay the loan 
rather than renewing it a bunch of times and then eventually defaulting.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 58. See Annesley H. DeGaris, Car Title Lending, 2 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION 
FOR JUSTICE: AAJ ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 1 (July 2007) 
(arguing that high rates “cannot be justified by the amount of risk assumed by 
the lender or business-related expenses, as the loans are fully secured and the 
lender does not store the pledged item while the debt is outstanding”); see also 
Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 41 (“A title loan is a high-interest, deeply 
over-secured, consumer loan . . . .”); see also Kristin Arnold, Car Title Lending: 
Short-Term Fix with Long-Term Expense, BANKRATE.COM (Nov. 18, 2005), 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/auto/car-title-lending-short-term-fix-with-
long-term-expense-1.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“The loan-to-value ratio is 
rarely greater than 33 percent, making it a win-win situation for the lender if 
the borrower defaults.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 59. See 146 CONG. REC. S167-05 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2000) (statement of Sen. 
Wellstone) (“Someone can take out a $100 loan, and the car might be worth 
$2,000, and these companies that we don’t do a darn thing about . . . . You 
repossess their car. You sell the car. You don’t even give them back the 
additional money you make beyond what they owed you.”); see also 146 CONG. 
REC. H5179-02 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. Mascara) (“When 
these loans are structured as a title pawn transaction, the title pawn broker 
sells the automobile and retains transfer to the pawn broker. The consumer 
loses all of his or her equity in the automobile and typically has little or no 
recourse to regain the automobile.”); see also DeGaris, supra note 58, at 2 
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lenders is that lenders seek deficiencies from borrowers. Martin 
and Adams argue that title loans are recourse loans and that 
lenders do sometimes seek deficiencies from borrowers.60 
So which are they—oversecured or undersecured? The data on 
the issue is as muddled as the claims made by opponents of title 
lending, seeming to support both sides. Data from state regulators 
suggest that either most loans are not oversecured, at least in the 
technical sense of that word, or that title lenders are violating the 
Uniform Commercial Code on a massive scale. In Tennessee, in 
2008, for instance, title lenders returned only $251,047 to 
borrowers as surpluses, but they wrote off $13.6 million in 
unrecoverable principal.61 While it is possible the unrecovered 
principal is partially derived from situations where something 
prevented the lender from recovering the vehicle at all, such as 
theft or the destruction of the vehicle, the fact that unrecovered 
principal was roughly fifty-two times the amount of surpluses 
suggests that the loans generally were undersecured.  
The notion that lenders repossess vehicles to generate 
significant profits is almost certainly wrong. Repossessing, storing, 
and selling vehicles are expensive relative to the value of most 
pledged vehicles. One operator estimated the costs at around $500 
for his company—$250 to pay a company to repossess the vehicle 
and $250 to pay for the sale;62 another confirmed that 
“[r]epossessions, at best, are a breakeven process and most often 
simply mitigate our loss.”63 Tennessee’s report from 2007 found 
                                                                                                     
(“Because . . . [they] are usually over-secured, these lenders face no risk from 
default. In fact, consumer advocates argue that title lenders benefit when a 
debtor defaults, thus allowing the lender to confiscate and resell the vehicle.”). 
 60. See Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 32. 
 61. See 2010 TENN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 8. Other years in Tennessee 
are similar. See TENN. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., 2008 REPORT ON THE TITLE PLEDGE 
INDUSTRY 7–12, available at http://www.state.tn.us/tdfi/compliance/tpl/TPL 
Report2008FinalFinal.pdf [hereinafter 2008 TENN. REPORT] (noting that, in 
2006, Tennessee lenders returned $1,256,068 to customers but had $11,394,220 
in unrecovered principal); TENN. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., REPORT ON THE TITLE 
PLEDGE INDUSTRY:  A SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2006 REPORT TO THE TENNESSEE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 7, available at http://www.tn.gov/tdfi/compliance/tpl/2007 
TPLSupplementalReport-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter 2006  TENN. REPORT SUPP.] 
(reporting that, in 2007, title lenders returned $171,579 to customers but had 
$5.1 million in unrecovered principal). 
 62. Reich Interview, supra note 51, at 1. 
 63. Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 5–6 . 
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firms spent, on average, $92.10 for repossession, $72.05 for storing 
vehicles until sale, and $4.02 for advertisements.64 These costs do 
not include collection costs and legal fees which lenders are 
probably entitled to under the title lending contracts. If we assume 
these sales generate half the vehicles’ value for the lender, the 
lender only makes money on cars that are on the higher end of the 
spectrum. As one lender pointed out to me, the proceeds from 
interest and fees are much more profitable than the proceeds from 
repossession, so lenders have little incentive to repossess cars to 
generate revenue.65  
Thus, it appears that most loans are not, under the technical 
definition of the word, oversecured. But, on the other hand, lenders 
rarely seek deficiencies from customers. In Oregon, 0.06% of loans 
in 200566 and 0.20% of loans in 200667 resulted in lenders obtaining 
a money judgment against a borrower. Lenders68 and even 
consumer advocates69 maintain that lenders generally do not 
pursue deficiencies even when it is legal to do so. 
                                                                                                     
 64. See TENN. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., 2006 REPORT TO THE TENNESSEE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 7–9, available at http://www.tn.gov/tdfi/compliance/tpl/2006 
GeneralAssemblyReportTitlePledge.pdf [hereinafter 2006  TENN. REPORT]. 
 65. See Davis & Davis Interview, supra note 24, at 2. 
 66. See OR. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AND BUS. SERVS., DIV. OF FIN. AND CORP. 
SEC., OREGON LICENSED CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES 2005 SHORT-TERM LOANS 
2, available at http://cbs.state.or.us/external/dfcs/cf/annual_reports/ 2005.pdf 
(reporting that 12 title loan transactions out of 17,801 resulted in the lender 
obtaining a money judgment). 
 67. See OR. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AND BUS. SERVS., DIV. OF FIN. AND CORP. 
SEC., OREGON LICENSED CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES 2006 SHORT-TERM 
LOANS, available at http://cbs.state.or.us/external/dfcs/cf/annual_reports/ 
2006.pdf [hereinafter 2006 OREGON REPORT] (reporting that lenders obtained 
money judgments on only 31 of 15,726 title loans). 
 68. For instance, although Texas law permits it to seek deficiencies, TDJ 
Financial Services never has in its eleven years operating in the state. See Davis 
& Davis Interview, supra note 24, at 2. The American Association of Responsible 
Auto Lenders (AARAL) also claims its members will not seek deficiencies. See 
AARAL, AARAL Best Practices Safeguard Consumers, http://www.responsible 
autolenders.org/bestpractices/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2012) (“Repossession of a 
consumer’s vehicle is rare and occurs only as a last resort. Should repossession 
occur, all proceeds from the sale of the vehicle in excess of the loan balance are 
returned to the consumer.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 69. See NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Jay Speer, Executive 
Director, Virginia Poverty Law Center & Sarah Mattson, Policy Director/NH 
Health Law Collaborative Director, New Hampshire Legal Assistance) (noting 
that, generally, after a title lender repossesses a car, “that is it”).  
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Based on this data, a disturbing asymmetry of title lending 
emerges. Even though, from the lenders’ perspective, they do not 
have much to gain from repossessing a car (because the loans are 
not technically oversecured), borrowers have a lot to lose, because 
their equity in the vehicle is consumed by the costs of repossession 
and resale.70 Regulation needs to account for this lack of 
symmetry. 
More importantly, the customers at the greatest risk are those 
who are probably in the weakest economic position—people with 
less valuable vehicles as collateral. If a customer’s car is only 
worth $400, but the customer gets a loan for $200 and defaults, the 
transaction will almost certainly generate a deficiency because the 
customer’s small amount of equity will be quickly used up by 
repossession costs. The less expensive the car, the more likely the 
lender will be unable to recoup the principal from repossession 
alone.  
c. Money Lent Relative to Income 
Opponents of title lending repeatedly argue that one of the 
chief predatory features of title lending is that lenders do not 
consider customers’ abilities to repay the loans.71 This argument 
                                                                                                     
 70. See Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing 
Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2244–45 (1999) (describing this asymmetry as 
a common feature in collateralized loans). Mann notes:  
[L]enders might take a lien on collateral expecting that the disastrous 
losses from repossession and liquidation by the lender would induce 
the borrower to repay the loan even if repayment alone is not value-
increasing for the borrower at the time payment comes due. Although 
different scholars have different perspectives on the question, some 
scholars believe that much of the force of secured credit comes from 
the leverage that the lender holds in that transaction: repossession 
and liquidation cost the borrower much more than they aid the 
lender.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 71. See, e.g., NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Sarah Mattson) 
(asserting that title loans are predatory because they are asset-based and 
indifferent to a borrower’s ability to repay); David Ress, Draft Regulations for 
Car-Title Loans Draw Lenders’ Fire, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 2009, 
at B3 (“Banning car-title loans on cars already being financed ‘would reduce the 
opportunity for aggressive lenders to lure borrowers into loans which they are 
not capable of repaying,’ the [consumer] group’s lawyer, David W. Clarke, 
added.”); Jean Ann Fox & Elizabeth Guy, Driven into Debt: CFA Car Title Loan 
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has had traction with policymakers,72 and title loan customers 
have sued because title lenders do not consider ability to repay.73  
On the other hand, the title lenders assert that they try to 
make repayment manageable. The lenders I interviewed all said 
that they consider customers’ ability to repay,74 and some lenders’ 
websites tell customers to bring proof of income, which suggests 
they consider ability to repay.75 EZCORP’s annual report tells 
                                                                                                     
Store and Online Survey, CONSUMER FED. OF AM. 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Car_Title_Loan_Report_111705.pdf (“Lenders 
don’t run credit checks or base loans on the borrower’s ability to repay. Loans 
are generally due in one month, with interest only renewals available.”); Martin 
& Adams, supra note 3, at 48 (“[T]he amount of each loan is unrelated to a 
person’s income; the amount is based solely upon the value of the vehicle used 
as collateral.”). 
 72. See Press Release, Governor Lynch’s Veto Message Regarding SB 57 
(July 6, 2011), http://www.governor.nh.gov/media/news/2011/070611-sb57.htm 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Lynch Press Release] (“At the same time, 
companies would be allowed to loan without any inquiry into a borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan and would even be allowed to loan to people receiving 
local welfare assistance.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 73. See Lester v. TitleMax, Inc. (In re TitleMax Holdings, LLC), 447 B.R. 
896, 903 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010) (remanding to state Court of Common Pleas).  
Before remanding, the bankruptcy court briefly noted the thrust of the suit: 
 The essential allegations were that the Defendant had violated 
South Carolina Consumer Protection Code, S.C. Code Ann. § 37-5-
108, which provides that if a loan is unconscionable or is induced by 
unconscionable conduct the court may strike the entire agreement or 
the unconscionable terms within it. Plaintiffs allege that the 
unconscionability is evidenced by their belief that the Defendant 
knew or should have known that the borrower was unable to make 
the scheduled loan payments, and that it had failed to ascertain the 
ability to repay through a loan credit check and an evaluation of the 
borrower’s debt to income ratio.  
Id. at 898 (citations omitted).  
 74. See Reich Interview, supra note 51, at 2. (stating that his company asks 
about income to make sure the customer can pay the monthly installment); 
Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 2 (“We always consider the customer’s 
ability to repay at the time of [the] loan, as we try to ensure that the customer’s 
payment obligation to us will be something that fits comfortably into his/her 
budget. An applicant must provide information about their monthly income as 
well as other indebtedness.”); Davis & Davis Interview, supra note 24, at 1 
(emphasizing the central importance the company places on the customer’s 
ability to repay); Vaugh & Bourns Interview, supra note 52, at 1 (asserting that 
Cash America’s product was designed to ensure that the customer could pay off 
the loan). 
 75. See Auto Cash, USA, Car Title Loan Required Items, http://www.auto 
cashusa.com/title-loan-required-items.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“When you 
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investors that “[l]oan amounts are established based on customers’ 
income levels, an inspection of the automobile and title and 
reference to market values of used automobiles.”76 An industry 
trade organization, the American Association of Responsible Auto 
Lenders, states on its “Best Practices” webpage that its members 
“keep consumers’ payments low enough so they are able to 
successfully pay off the loan . . . .”77 Texas-based TJD Financial 
Services goes farther than most lenders, by requiring a four-page 
application that lists not only income but also all liabilities, so the 
lender can ensure that customers can repay their obligations.78  
Ultimately, it is impossible to know whether title lenders are 
actually evaluating borrowers’ ability to repay, without data from 
lenders that show customers’ income, loan amounts, and other 
debt obligations. A less direct approach involves looking at 
whether people pay off their loans or sacrifice payments to other 
creditors to repay their title loans. These questions are taken up in 
Parts I.C.1 and I.C.4.  
3. Are Title Borrowers Overly Optimistic About Rollovers? 
One important concern about title lending is whether 
borrowers are overly optimistic when they begin the title loan 
transaction about how many times they will roll over or renew the 
loan. If borrowers are making poor decisions because they 
misjudge their future conditions, regulators could intervene to 
correct these errors. Academics make the claim that borrowers do 
not understand “the consequences of their lending arrangement.”79  
                                                                                                     
visit one of our licensed vendors’ title loan stores, please bring the following: 
Clear Car Title; Driver’s license or state-issued I.D. card; Proof of Income; 
Vehicle for an inspection.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 76. EZCORP, Inc., supra note 31, at 6. 
 77. See AARAL, supra note 68 (“AARAL member companies keep 
consumers’ payments low enough so they are able to successfully pay off the 
loan and get their title back.”). 
 78. See The Loan Depot, Apply for a Loan, http://www.yourloan 
depot.com/apply_for_a_loan.php (last visited Apr. 8`, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 79. Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 BANKING 
L.J. 483, 491 (2005). One news story pointed out that title-lending customers 
operate on a “false hope.” Arnold, supra note 58. In the context of payday 
lending, however, scholars have expressly stated that borrowers are overly 
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The optimism bias is one of the most robustly established 
biases in the literature on behavioral economics.80 It would not be 
surprising if people are overly optimistic about the likelihood they 
will pay off their title loans with few rollovers. Social scientists use 
a variety of methods to establish that people are overly optimistic 
in specific situations; one method is to ask people about their 
expected outcomes in a situation and compare their expected 
outcomes to the actual outcomes of people in the same situation.81 
In the title lending survey, we asked customers: “How many 
months total do you anticipate it taking you to completely pay off 
this loan (after all renewals/rollovers)?”82 Since we spoke to people 
who were just taking out a loan that day, as well as people who 
had been rolling over for some time, I report here only the people 
who had just completed taking out a loan or had had it out just one 
month, which amounted to eighteen customers. Of those, 33.33% 
(n = 6) predicted taking one month to pay off the loan, 27.78% (n = 
5) predicted taking 2 months, 22.22%  (n = 4) predicted taking 3 
months, 11.11% (n = 2) predicted taking 4 months, and 5.56% (n = 
1) predicted taking 5 months.83 Because virtually all accounts 
suggest higher numbers of rollovers among actual borrowers in 
similar situations,84 the people we surveyed were overly optimistic 
about the likelihood they would pay off their loan quickly.  
                                                                                                     
optimistic about how many times they will roll over their loans. See, e.g., Oren 
Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 44–45 
(2008) (“A customer who misestimates her ability to repay the loan in fourteen 
days will likely roll the loan over for another fourteen days. Payday lenders 
target such customers, amassing 90% of their profits from borrowers who roll 
over their loans five or more times during a year.”); Alan White, Behavior and 
Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 161–62 (2007) (“The payday lenders, even by 
naming their product, actively seek to encourage the consumer’s mistaken idea 
that the loan is very short-term and low-cost.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Ron Harris & Einat Albin, Bankruptcy Policy in Light of 
Manipulation in Credit Advertising, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 431, 434 (2006) 
(discussing optimism bias in the context of student loans). 
 81. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship 
Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of 
Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993) (“Respondents’ predictions for 
the permanence of their own marriages and the consequences should they be 
divorced were much more optimistic than their perceptions of the likelihood and 
effects of divorce for others.”). 
 82. See HAWKINS SURVEY, supra note 7, at 1. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Industry insiders and state regulators report a variety of different 
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4. Costs of Title Loans 
The high cost of title lending is a central concern of 
policymakers, judges, opponents of title lending, and anyone 
attempting to understand how to regulate the product.85 
Information about the average of title loan interest rates is 
frequently reported. Jean Ann Fox and Elizabeth Guy report a 
median rate of “25 percent per month finance charge, which 
translates to 300 percent annual interest, plus $25 per loan.”86 
Without a doubt, interest rates are high.  
Members of Congress have expressed concern that title 
borrowers “are unaware of applicable rates,”87 but one study of title 
lending argues that title loans “have highly transparent and easily 
understood pricing schemes.”88 The people we surveyed did not 
exhibit an understanding of the high relative cost of title loans 
compared to credit card debt. Only 25.71% (n = 9) recognized that a 
title loan is a lot more expensive than credit card debt, while 
17.14% (n = 6) thought a title loan is a lot less expensive than 
credit card debt. 5.71% (n = 2) thought a title loan was a little less 
expensive than credit card debt, and 31.43% (n = 11) thought the 
two were about the same cost.89 While this small sample of people 
may not be indicative of borrowers generally, it is disturbing how 
few people understood the relative cost of their title loan.  
                                                                                                     
lengths of payoff time. See, e.g., 2008 TENN. REPORT, supra note 61, at 6 
(reporting seven rollovers on average in Tennessee); NCLC Webinar, supra note 
48 (recounting the TitleMax CEO’s observation that customers renew eight 
times on average); AARAL, supra note 68 (“Most loans are paid back in six 
months or less.”). But see Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 3 (“Most 
customers have paid off their loan within 90 days.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 
179 (Wis. 2006) (Butler, J., concurring) (“Predatory lenders exploit borrowers 
through excessively high interest rates.”); TMX Finance, supra note 11, at 21 
(“The consumer advocacy groups and media reports generally focus on the cost 
to a consumer for this type of loan . . . .”); Lynch Press Release, supra note 72 (“I 
am vetoing this legislation [which would raise the interest rate above 36% for 
title loans] because legalizing excessive interest rates for title loans—rates of 
300 percent APR—would be detrimental to our families, our communities, and 
to our economy.”). 
 86. Fox & Guy, supra note 71, at 2. 
 87. H.R. Con. Res. 312, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 88. Zywicki, supra note 3, at 437. 
 89. See HAWKINS SURVEY, supra note 7. 
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While customers might not understand the cost of title loans 
relative to credit cards, it appears firms do compete for business 
based on price. It is often repeated that fringe banking companies 
compete on nonfinancial bases such as convenience and 
friendliness.90 Title lenders themselves note the important role 
nonfinancial issues such as staffing, location, and the cleanliness of 
facilities play in capturing business.91 Some academics go further 
to claim that there is virtually no price competition in fringe 
lending markets like payday lending.92  
The truism that borrowers are insensitive to price, however, 
does not appear to apply to title lending because price seems to 
play a key role in obtaining business. TitleMax publicly disclosed 
to its creditors that its success is due in part to the fact it 
“charge[s] as much as fifty percent (50%) below the interest rates 
charged by its competitors.”93 Similarly, EZCORP tells investors 
that competitive pricing is a “primary element[] of competition.”94 
                                                                                                     
 90. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 3, at 391 (“[N]ontraditional lenders 
compete intensely on nonfinancial margins: As noted, they offer longer hours, 
provide highly-personalized customer service, and have many more storefronts 
than traditional lenders, competing on convenience.”); Robin A. Prager, 
Determinants of the Locations of Payday Lenders, Pawnshops and Check-
Cashing Outlets 15 (Fed. Res. Bd., Div. of Research & Statistics, FEDS Working 
Paper No. 2009-33, 2009); available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/ 
2009/200933/200933pap.pdf (observing that alternative financial service 
providers locate near customers based on a variety of sociological factors). 
 91. See, e.g., Reich Interview, supra note 51, at 5 (noting the importance of 
having a visible location and treating customers well); Anonymous Interview, 
supra note 24, at 7 (“We rely on television and radio marketing, friendly and 
trust-worthy service, [and] attractive locations in accessible parts of town.”); 
EZCORP, Inc., supra note 31, at 11 (“We believe that the primary elements of 
competition are the quality of customer service and relationship management, 
store location and the ability to loan competitive amounts at competitive 
rates.”); Titlemax Disclosure Statement, supra note 53, at 5 (“The success of the 
Debtors’ business is attributable to several factors including, but not limited 
to . . . employ[ing] a highly-motivated and well-trained sales force that 
accurately judge [sic] the appropriate amount of the Customer Loan [and] the 
Debtors have highly visible locations and brand recognition.”). 
 92. See ROBERT MAYER, QUICK CASH: THE STORY OF THE LOAN SHARK 54–56 
(2010) (attributing the lack of competition in fringe lending to “information 
failure,” due to lenders’ concealment of charges and borrowers’ failure to search 
for the lowest prices). 
 93. Titlemax Disclosure Statement, supra note 53, at 5. 
 94. EZCORP, Inc., supra note 31, at 11. 
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Title lenders’ advertisements confirm the importance of price 
in competition. Some lenders emphasize cost in their 
advertisements: “[Y]ou’re also certain you’re getting the lowest 
guaranteed interest rates anywhere in Texas on your car title 
loans! To go from a high-interest short period to a low-interest long 
period, you can always have your car title loan refinanced with 
us.”95 Some companies even make cost comparisons for customers 
between themselves and other companies.96  
Different companies appear to offer different rates. In 
Tennessee, regulators determined that 53% of companies charged 
22% a month, the maximum rate allowed by law, while the other 
47% of companies charged between 10% and 21% a month.97 In 
Oregon, in 2006, before interest rates were capped at 36%, the 
maximum rate charged was 663%, but the average rate was 
318%.98 As a local example, companies in Houston charge rates 
ranging from 217.7%,99 to 144.95%,100 to 114.0%.101 
                                                                                                     
 95. Sugar Land Car Title Loans, http://www.sugarlandtitle 
loans.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); see also Magnolia Loans & Insurance, Title Loan FAQs, 
http://www.magnolia-loans.com/faqs/title-loan-faqs/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) 
(advertising its ability to offer cheaper loans than its competitors because 
Magnolia has “fewer expenses” and is “honest and straightforward and 
believe[s] in making quality loans that people can afford to pay back”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 96. See, e.g., Advantage Finance, Houston Car Title Loans From Advantage 
Finance LLC, http://www.cartitleloanshouston.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) 
(comparing itself to two other types of title loan products) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 97. 2010 TENN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 10–11. 
 98. 2006 OREGON REPORT, supra note 67, at 1. 
 99. See Texas Title Loans, http://txtitleloans.net/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) 
(comparing its rates to those of competitors with an amortization table) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 100. EZCORP has a store at 8502 Main St. #D, Houston, Texas that, on 
September 1, 2011, was publicly advertising title loans at “12%” (per month, 
presumably). 
 101. See Advantage Finance, Houston Car Title Loans From Advantage 
Finance LLC, http://www.cartitleloanshouston.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) 
(comparing its rates to those of competitors with an amortization table) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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C. Cars as Collateral 
The central objection to title lending relates to the use of the 
consumer’s vehicle as collateral for the loan. This subpart explores 
some of the factual issues underlying this objection.  
1. How Often Do Lenders Repossess Vehicles? 
There is a lot of questionable or unclear data about how often 
title lenders repossess cars. Many sources, including members of 
Congress,102 assert without offering any proof that lenders “often” 
repossess people’s cars.103 Even some of those interpreting evidence 
about repossessions have reported misguided information about 
how often lenders repossess vehicles. 
For instance, in a 2007 law review article, Jean Ann Fox 
claims, based on reports generated by Tennessee’s Department of 
Financial Institutions, that from 35% to over 50% of loans in 
Tennessee result in the title lender repossessing the vehicle.104 To 
come up with this figure, she took the total number of title loan 
agreements reported in Tennessee and divided it by the number of 
times customers roll over or renew the loans on average. She 
compared that figure to the number of repossessions and concluded 
that the repossession rate is between 35% and 50%, depending on 
                                                                                                     
 102. See 146 CONG. REC. 12,524 (2000) (“At such a high interest rate, many 
of these [title loan] borrowers are unable to pay off their loan and their vehicles 
are repossessed.” (emphasis added)). 
 103. See, e.g., DeGaris, supra note 58, at 2 (“A title loan often ends in 
repossession.” (emphasis added)); Arnold, supra note 58 (“Fox [of the CFA] . . . 
says . . . , ‘They purposely target borrowers who cannot afford the high-cost, 
short-term balloon loans, virtually guaranteeing that many of the loans will 
fail . . . .’” (emphasis added)); Newest Form of Predatory Lending Strikes, NEWS 
& ADVANCE (Lynchburg, VA), Dec. 10, 2008, http://www2.newsadvance.com/ 
news/2008/dec/10/newest_form_of_predatory_lending_strikes-ar-220374/ (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“Another consequence of car title loans is a high 
repossession rate.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Silverman, supra note 79, at 491 (“In cases of default, lenders are quick to 
repossess and sell the car . . . .”). 
 104. See Jean Ann Fox, Fringe Bankers: Economic Predators or New 
Financial Services Model?, 30 W. NEW ENGL. L. REV. 135, 140 (2007) 
(“Consumers who pledge car titles as security for small loans run the risk of 
losing their vehicle.”).  
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whether we assume borrowers roll over their loans three or seven 
times.105 
The problem with this analysis is that the Department of 
Financial Institutions considers the “total number of title loan 
agreements” to mean only new agreements, not renewals or 
rollovers. Although later reports make it explicit,106 the report Fox 
was using is unclear on this point, so her confusion is 
understandable.107 The employee responsible for creating the 
report in Tennessee, however, confirmed to me that the number of 
agreements did not include rollovers in that report either.108 Thus, 
in determining the repossession rate, we should not divide the 
number of loans by the average rollovers. Fox’s repossession rates 
are inflated three to seven times the real amount. 
Similarly, an influential report from the Woodstock Institute 
finds 18% of title loans in Illinois end in repossession.109 The actual 
repossession rate is higher, the report argues, because this figure 
does not include “repossessions that occur immediately after 
default where a court case is not filed by the lender.”110 The 
problem, however, is that this repossession rate is not calculated 
based on all the title loans in Illinois but merely reflects the 
repossession rate in cases where the lender sued to collect money 
                                                                                                     
 105. Id. Fox notes: 
Tennessee regulators reported that 10,933 vehicles were repossessed 
for nonpayment in 2005 out of a total 92,489 loan agreements. If 
every Tennessee borrower renews a loan just three times, that is a 
35% repossession rate. If every loan is renewed seven times, as 
indicated by an earlier Tennessee Department of Financial 
Institutions report, more than half of the cars pledged for loans are 
eventually lost by borrowers. 
Id. 
 106. The report generated in 2008 concerning data from 2006 explicitly 
states that the “total number of [title pledge] agreements” “reflects new 
agreements made and does not include renewals of these initial agreements.” 
2008 TENN. REPORT, supra note 61, at 4.  
 107. See 2006 TENN. REPORT SUPP., supra note 61, at 7 (stating the total title 
pledge agreement figure without explaining whether it incorporates rollovers 
into that figure or not). 
 108. E-mail from Steve Henley, Tenn. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., to Jim Hawkins 
(Aug. 4, 2011, 14:33 CST) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 109. See WOODSTOCK INST. & PUB. ACTION FOUND., DEBT DETOUR: THE 
AUTOMOBILE TITLE LENDING INDUSTRY IN ILLINOIS 5 (2007). 
 110. Id. 
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from the borrower.111 Cases in collection likely have a different 
repossession rate than cases outside collection. Moreover, cases 
with loans that have sufficiently high values to encourage a suit 
likely have different repossession rates than the general 
population of title loans. Thus, the Woodstock Institute report does 
not provide any evidence of the repossession rate for all title loan 
agreements. 
Nathalie Martin and Ozymandias Adams state in a new 
paper, based on reports from New Mexico, that “between 20% and 
71% of the title loan customers have their vehicles repossessed.”112 
Martin and Adams’s calculations rely on the summary data in the 
New Mexico reports, and they use this data to calculate various 
averages. Important here, they calculate the average amount of 
each loan by comparing the total principal for all loans originated 
during the calendar year to the total principal amount outstanding 
on all loans at the end of the calendar year.113 They calculate the 
number of loans per year (a number omitted from the New Mexico 
report but present in almost all other state reports) by dividing the 
total amount of principal by the average loan amount.114 Finally, 
they use the average times a person took out a new title loan that 
the state generates. 
To calculate how often people lose their vehicles, Martin and 
Adams divide the total number of loans (a figure generated 
through computing the average size of each loan) by the average 
number of times a person took out a new loan. Then, they divide 
the quotient by the number of repossessions in the year.115 
Beginning with such estimated data leads to two fundamental 
computational problems. First, as Martin and Adams note, “[o]ne 
problem with the yearly summaries is that they average all of the 
data, including obvious outliers.”116 This introduces some unknown 
                                                                                                     
 111. See id. at 2 (explaining that the statistics generated in the report are 
based on an analysis of cases filed against title borrowers). 
 112. Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 45. In another article, Martin 
suggests that one-third of borrowers lose their cars. See Nathalie Martin, 
Regulating Payday Loans: Why This Should Make the CFPB’s Short List, 2 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1446 (2011), available at http://www.hblr.org/wp-
content/uploads/ 2011/07/Martin-Payday-Loans.pdf. 
 113. Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at tbl.4. 
 114. Id. at 80. 
 115. Id. at 64. 
 116. Id.  
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error rate into each original average. Once two such averages are 
combined to perform a calculation, the error rate is compounded. 
Second, Martin and Adams perform their computations under 
the assumption that dividing the averages of two variables results 
in a third average—the average of the divided variables. This is 
not true.117 As a result of beginning with averaged data, Martin 
and Adams have no choice but to reverse the correct order of 
arithmetic in averaging, resulting in potentially skewed final 
numbers. 
Finally, Todd Zywicki finds that around 8% of loans lead to 
repossession based on state reports and interviews with title 
lending companies.118 Based on his discussion of this repossession 
rate, however, it is unclear if Zywicki is reporting the number of 
new title loan agreements that led to repossession or the number 
of renewals or rollovers that led to repossession.119 Based on the 
data I report below, it appears that Zywicki is reporting 
repossessions per new loan agreement, but it is not entirely clear. 
To attempt to understand how often customers lose their 
vehicles, I interviewed title lenders and evaluated reports 
generated by state regulators. One title lender informed me that 
its database tracks repossession rates per customer,120 and that 5% 
to 6% of customers lose their vehicles.121 News stories report the 
nation’s largest lender stating that the repossession rate per 
                                                                                                     
 117. For instance, say Variable A has data points {1, 3, 5} and Variable B 
has data points {2, 4, 6}. The average of Variable A is 3 and the average of 
Variable B is 4. Thus (the average of Variable A) divided by (the average of 
Variable B) is 3/4 or 27/36. This is not the same as the average of (Variable A 
divided by Variable B). (Variable A divided by Variable B) results in the set {1/2, 
3/4, 5/6} with an average of 25/36. The former method is the one employed by 
Martin and Adams, while the latter is the more mathematically sound. 
 118. See Zywicki, supra note 3, at 435.  
 119. See Adam Levitin, Auto Title Lending Data, CREDIT SLIPS (Jan. 14, 
2011 11:50 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/01/auto-title-
lending-data.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“[Zywicki’s data] also seemed 
highly skewed by the fact they were counting loans rather than borrowers. Title 
loans are 30-day loans that can be rolled over, but a roll-over counts as a new 
roll, which effectively inflates the denominator for default rates.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 120. Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 5.  
 121. See E-mail from Anonymous Title Lender to Jim Hawkins (Jan. 1, 
2011, 15:13 CST) (“Our average national repossession rate is between 5 and 6%. 
This is based on a ratio of repossession per customer not loans.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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customer is 7%.122 A smaller operator in Texas told me that they 
repossess around 10% of customers vehicles but that customers 
redeem the vehicles 6–7% of the time, resulting in 3–4% of people 
losing their vehicles.123 Similarly, another Texas lender with two 
stores indicated that 7.2% of its loans result in repossession, 
meaning roughly 10% of borrowers lost their vehicles.124 
I have combined the data from the six states’ reports in Table 
2 below. None of the states report how many new loan agreements 
a customer takes out on average a year, so it is impossible to know 
how many customers lose their vehicles from title lending. But 
these figures do not include rollovers or renewals under the 
“number of title loans,” so the repossession rates reported below 
are rates per new title lending agreement.125  
Because some customers take out more than one new loan a 
year, the repossession rate per customer could be higher. We do 
know, however, that the repossession rate per customer is not 
                                                                                                     
 122. See Richard Locker, No Progress on Title-Lending Bill: Coalition, 
Industry Pitch Sides, but Panel OKs Nothing, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, July 
23, 2008, available at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2008/jul/23/no-progress-
on-title-lending-bill/?printer=1/ (“The . . . vice president of Atlanta-based 
Community Loans of America . . . said ‘only 7 percent of customers had their 
cars seized . . . .’”). For another report not based on repossessions per customer, 
see Sue Kirchhoff, Some Consumers Run into Big Problems with Auto Title 
Lending, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 2006, available at http://www.usa 
today.com/money/perfi/general/2006-12-26-title-loans-usat_x.htm (“Rod Aycox, 
president of LoanMax auto title and its affiliated companies throughout the 
country, made about half a million loans this year and repossessed cars in 5% of 
the cases, or 25,000 autos, according to a statement from his firm.”). 
 123. Davis & Davis Interview, supra note 24. 
 124. Cone Interview, supra note 24. 
 125. I have e-mails from regulators in Tennessee and Montana that confirm 
the number of loan agreements does not include rollovers or renewals. See E-
mail from Steve Henley, Tenn. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., to Jim Hawkins (Aug. 4, 
2011, 14:33 CST) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); E-mail 
from Linda Leffler, Mont. Div. of Banking & Fin. Insts., to Jim Hawkins (Aug. 5, 
2011, 16:57 CST) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The 
Illinois report plainly does not count renewals as different loans because it 
states that the average length of time the borrower had a loan was over 300 
days, which reflects multiple renewals of a single loan. The Oregon report lists 
rollovers separately from total loan agreements, indicating the former does not 
include the latter. See 2009 OREGON REPORT, supra note 37, at 2. And, for some 
years in Oregon, rollovers were prohibited, so the total number of loans could 
not include rollovers. The Virginia report says the average number of days 
customers had loans was 305, which indicates the loan number includes 
rollovers. See VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 36, at 84.  
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much higher than the repossession rate per new loan because the 
lengths of loans reported in different states are all quite high. Few 
customers could have more than one loan out during the year.  










Tennessee128 2008 161,417 14,832 9.18% 
 2007 139,319 18,199 13.06% 
 Nov. 2005–June 2006 92,489 10,933 11.82% 
 2004 250,593 17,313 6.91% 
Oregon129 2009 17,820 2 0.01% 
 2008 10,136 1 0.00% 
 2007 8,568 32 0.37% 
 2006 15,726 125 0.80% 
 2005 17,801 114 0.64% 
Idaho130 2010 34,247 2382 6.96% 
Illinois131 Oct. 2009–June 2011 155,094 7,334 4.73% 
Montana132 2009 12,727 599 4.71% 
Virginia133 Oct. 2010–Dec. 2010 24,975 194134 0.78% 
Based on the information in Table 2, the repossession rates in 
these six states are much lower than previous research has 
indicated. 
                                                                                                     
 126. The year noted in Table 2 represents the year the data were gathered, 
not the year the data were reported. 
 127. These figures exclude cases in which customers redeemed repossessed 
collateral because in those cases customers did not in fact lose their vehicles. 
 128. To view these reports, see TENN. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., Title Pledge 
Reports, http://www.tn.gov/tdfi/compliance/tpl/TPLreports.html (last visited Apr. 
8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 129. To view these reports, see OR. DIV. OF FIN. AND CORP. SEC., Consumer 
Finance, Payday, and Title Lending Annual Activity, http://www.cbs.state.or. 
us/external/dfcs/activity_reports/consumer_finance.html (last visited Apr. 8, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 130. On file with the Washington and Lee Law Review. 
 131. On file with the Washington and Lee Law Review. 
 132. On file with the Washington and Lee Law Review. 
 133. See generally VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 36. 
 134. This number likely overstates the number of vehicles consumers lost 
because the report states that only two vehicles were sold by lenders, indicating 
customers redeemed some repossessed vehicles. Id. at 84.  
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2. Are Borrowers Overly Optimistic About the Chances Their 
Vehicle Will Be Repossessed? 
It is possible that lenders frame the transaction to minimize 
customers’ awareness of the potential loss of their vehicles.135 
Borrowers might think the risk of losing their car is lower than it 
really is, so they undervalue the risk when making the decision 
whether to enter into the transaction. Put another way, borrowers 
might be “operating on false hopes” regarding whether their car 
will be repossessed.136 The facts that borrowers do not have to turn 
over their vehicle or even their title to the vehicle in some cases 
has led some commentators to theorize that borrowers do not feel 
the potential loss at the time of the transaction.137 Legislators have 
even argued that title lenders deceive borrowers about the 
likelihood their car will be repossessed: “These pay-day loans, title 
loans, where you come in and hand the title of your car over and 
they give you a basic loan and say: We are not going to take your 
car away. The next thing you know, interest rates are going up, 
you refinance the loan, and pretty soon you may lose your car.”138 
To test whether borrowers are overly optimistic about the 
likelihood their car would be repossessed, I asked them, “What do 
you think is the percentage chance the lender will repossess your 
vehicle?” Unlike my analysis of optimism for rollovers, I include all 
responses here, regardless of how long the customer had had the 
                                                                                                     
 135. See Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 
AKRON L. REV. 725, 731 (2005) (“[P]redatory lenders go to extreme lengths to 
frame their loans as gains and to obscure potential losses.”). 
 136. Arnold, supra note 58. 
 137. See Jean Braucher, Theories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of 
Structure and Culture, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 332 (2006) (“Title 
‘pawn’ loans allow consumers to get non-purchase-money secured auto loans, 
without the cautionary event of a transfer of possession but with the risk of 
losing a car used to get to work.”); see also Dave Ress, Proposed Regulations for 
Car-Title Loans Draw Fire, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 2009, available 
at http://www2.timesdispatch.com/business/2009/nov/04/b-payd04_20091103-21 
1405-ar-15441/ (“‘A borrower . . . should be fully aware that he has given the 
lender a lien on his vehicle and that he may lose his vehicle if he doesn’t 
repay . . . . This will not necessarily be clear to the borrower unless he is 
required to surrender his title.’” (quoting James W. Speer, executive director of 
the Virginia Poverty Law Center) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 138. 156 CONG. REC. S3021 (daily ed. May 3, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Durbin). 
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loan out. 54.29% (n = 19) of those we surveyed predicted a 0% 
chance that the lender would repossess their vehicle, 2.86% (n = 1) 
predicted a 5% chance, while 40% (n = 14) predicted a 10% or 
greater chance their vehicle would be repossessed.139 For 
borrowers taking out a loan the date they were surveyed, 75% 
(n = 6) predicted a 0% chance they would lose their vehicle. 
Regardless of which state’s or lender’s data we use, most of the 
people we surveyed exhibited too optimistic a view of whether the 
lender would repossess their vehicle. 
3. Do Lenders Use Collateral as a Terror Mechanism to Encourage 
Repayment? 
Even if lenders do not actually repossess borrowers’ vehicles, 
some commentary on title lending suggests that the mere threat of 
repossession is sufficient to cause borrowers to continue to make 
payments on the title loan. More specifically, opponents argue that 
using vehicles as collateral causes borrowers to prioritize their title 
loan payments over other bills140 and gives lenders substantial 
bargaining leverage over borrowers.141 It is not the value of the 
                                                                                                     
 139. Four people predicted a 10% chance, one person predicted a 15% 
chance, two people predicted a 20% chance, one person predicted a 30% chance, 
two people predicted a 50% chance, one person predicted a 70% chance, and two 
people mysteriously predicted a 100% chance. Two people did not answer this 
question. See HAWKINS SURVEY, supra note 7.  
 140. See, e.g., DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES 
DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 7, 44 
(2006) [hereinafter DOD REPORT], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ 
pdfs/Report_to_Congress_final.pdf (“[Car title pawns] provide undue and 
coercive pressure on military borrowers and allow lenders more latitude in 
making loans without proper regard for the Service member’s ability to 
repay. . . . The use of . . . car titles pressure[s] the borrower to consider loan 
payments as being their top priority.”); NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks 
of Leslie Parrish) (arguing that title loans cause borrowers to drop their other 
bills to make sure they pay on their title loan); Id. (remarks of Jay Speer) 
(reporting that two people seeking legal help claimed they would pay down their 
title loan before they paid their rent). 
 141. See DOD REPORT, supra note 140, at 7; see also NCLC Webinar, supra 
note 48 (remarks of Sarah Mattson) (asserting that title lenders use the 
powerful leverage of repossession over consumers in negotiations to set up 
repayment plans). 
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vehicle that compels repayment but, instead, the cost of 
purchasing a replacement.142  
The fact that some lenders in Virginia used to take out a 
second lien on a vehicle, which would not allow them to actually 
recover anything, provides some evidence of the role terror could 
pay in title loan transactions.143 Yet, the value of the vehicle sets 
the amount of the loan in most cases. Thus, lenders must not view 
the collateral merely as a means of forcing repayment, because 
they use it as a baseline for how much to lend. 
To test the coercive force of using a vehicle as collateral, I 
asked customers, “If you couldn’t pay off all your bills one month, 
which bills would you NOT pay so you could pay on this loan?” We 
provided various categories of bills. Table 3 reports the results. 
Table 3: Bills Borrowers Would Not Pay in Order to Pay Title Loan 
Bill Percentage Number 
Rent or Mortgage Payment 5.71% 2 
Utilities 5.71% 2 
Credit card debt 62.86% 22 
Groceries 11.43% 4 
Medical 11.43% 4 
Other: 
Including pet bill, cable bill, internet service, 
cellular phone bill 
22.86% 8 
Table 3 indicates that the people we surveyed would not 
prioritize their title loan payments over their basic necessities such 
as rent, utilities, groceries, or medical expenses. The survey does 
suggest the people we surveyed prioritize paying the title lender 
before their credit card company, but this preference does not 
indicate that title borrowers are terrorized into prioritizing their 
title loan payments. 
4. Do Customers Have Other Transportation to Work? 
A central factual question in the policy debates about title 
lending is whether people taking out title loans have other means 
                                                                                                     
 142. See NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Jay Speer). 
 143. See id. (asserting that some lenders in Virginia, like Advance America, 
do title loans with a second lien on the vehicle to make borrowers think the 
lender can take the car and sell it, even though Virginia law does not allow 
lenders to take a second lien on a vehicle). 
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of transportation. This issue is important because, if title loans 
cause people to lose their jobs or fail to show up to doctors’ 
appointments, it is much easier to link title lending to other social 
ills.  
It is hard to overstate how important this issue is to 
policymakers considering title lending. Consumer advocates make 
this argument the center of their strategy against title lending.144 
Academic papers145 and press reports146 have also taken up the 
theme, reporting the argument that title loans are “more 
                                                                                                     
 144. See, e.g., Payday and Title Loans, Hearing Before the Illinois Senate 
Fin. Comm. (1999) (statement of Daniel A. Edelman, on behalf of the Illinois 
Consumer Justice Council), available at http://www.edcombs.com/CM/News/ 
news20.asp (“No collateral should be permitted on these high-interest loans. 
There is no justification for 200 or 300% fully secured loans. Consumers who 
need automobiles to get to work and stay off welfare should not be losing their 
cars to ‘title lenders.’”); NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Jessica 
Hiemenz) (noting the main concern with auto title lending is the risk of 
repossession); Barry Yeoman, Sudden Debt?, AARP THE MAGAZINE, Sep./Oct. 
2006, at 129 (“They’re really devastating for elderly people who need their 
cars.”); Loans Secured by Car Titles Trap Borrowers in Cycle of Debt, CONSUMER 
AFFAIRS (Apr. 18, 2005), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/ 
car_loans.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (noting that the loans in “many cases” 
end in the repossession of the car “after the borrower has made substantial 
payments” and that this is “devastating because a car is often the borrower’s 
largest asset and his or her only way to get to work”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 145. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 104, at 140 (noting the risk to “vital 
transportation”); Braucher, supra note 137, at 332 (pointing out that title loans 
expose borrowers to “the risk of losing a car used to get to work”); Barr, supra 
note 8, at 166 (“With title lending . . . the borrower risks losing her car, which 
may be her regular way to get to work, and to transport children to and from 
school or child care.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Elinat Paz-Frankel, Opponents of Auto Title Lending Industry 
Hope Legislature Limits ‘Outrageous’ Fees, MEMPHIS BUS. J., Aug. 22, 2008 
(noting that “[c]ars are used as collateral for title loans” and that “when vehicles 
are repossessed, borrowers often are left with no means of driving to work”); 
Kirchhoff, supra note 122 (“If borrowers can’t pay back the loans, often due in 30 
days, they often roll them over, with multiplying fees. If they still fall behind, 
their cars can be repossessed. That contributes to a downward spiral, with 
people unable to get to work, a doctor or drive their kids to school.”); Newest 
Form of Predatory Lending Strikes, supra note 103 (“A lobbyist for . . . 
LoanMax . . . said that reducing the rate to 36 percent would effectively put the 
company out of business. So be it. Such an alternative is far preferable to 
preying on the poor at the ultimate expense of depriving them of their only 
means of transportation.”). 
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damaging than payday loans because borrowers who cannot pay 
the required fees lose their transportation to and from work.”147  
Most importantly, government officials have placed 
tremendous stock in the argument that people will lose their only 
way to get to work. One Congressman asserted that repossessions 
by title lenders “often” result in the loss of a job.148 The House of 
Representatives itself passed a resolution calling on states to 
intervene in title lending markets because “title loans and title 
pawns threaten the ability of consumers to hold a job since default 
on the loan or pawn will result in repossession and sale of their 
car, which is often their only means of transportation to and from 
work . . . .”149 The Department of Defense, in its report urging 
Congress to take action to prohibit high cost loans to service 
members, stated that title loans endanger “essential 
transportation.”150 Even judges have expressed concern that if “a 
payment is missed, the lender can start the process of taking the 
borrower’s vehicle, resulting in a loss of transportation to work and 
to obtain health care.”151  
Officials’ concerns about the risk of losing transportation have 
resulted in real-world consequences. The governor of New 
Hampshire recently vetoed a law that would have permitted title 
lending in the state because “[f]ailure to repay a loan could lead to 
seizure of the family car, which is often essential for family 
                                                                                                     
 147. JEFF PETERSON, ARIZ. RURAL POLICY INST., PREDATORY LENDING: PROFILE 
AND ANALYSIS 5 (2007); see also Frank Burt et al., Refund Anticipation, Payday, 
and Auto Title Loans: A Survey of Select Fringe Lending Products, JORDEN BURT 
LLP, May 2006, at 21, available at http://www.jordenburt.com/attachments/ 
489.pdf (“Unlike the loss of a television or other electronic good, the loss of a car 
because of a default on a loan can have extensive ramifications for a person who 
needs the car for work, grocery shopping, care of children, and other daily 
necessities.”). 
 148. 146 CONG. REC. 12,524 (2000) (“As is the case for most Americans, these 
consumers depend on their automobiles and trucks for transportation to their 
jobs, vital medical appointments, and school for their children. So the loss of a 
vehicle through an unfair foreclosure often results in the loss of a job or other 
serious consequences.”). 
 149. H.R. Con. Res. 312, 106th Cong., 146 CONG. REC. 12,523 (2000) 
(enacted). 
 150. DOD REPORT, supra note 140, at 16 (“The high cost and risk of car title 
loans traps borrowers in repeated loan renewals in order to keep from losing 
essential transportation and key family assets.”). 
 151. Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 179 (Wis. 
2006) (Butler, J., concurring). 
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members to maintain employment.”152 Wisconsin Governor Jim 
Doyle used his veto power to outlaw title lending in Wisconsin 
because “[a]uto title loans can result in individuals losing their 
vehicles due to failure to make timely payments on relatively small 
loan amounts, putting at high risk an asset that is essential to the 
well-being of working families.”153 The most common regulatory 
response, as demonstrated in the cases of Wisconsin and New 
Hampshire, is to ban title lending. In 2009, a Wisconsin state 
legislator supported a ban on title lending because “most folks 
need that car for work, family, etc.”154  
Yet, despite the frequency of this claim, there is absolutely no 
data, except for that generated by the industry discussed below, 
about whether people using title loans have more than one vehicle. 
Consumer advocates arguing against title loans concede that we 
have no information about what vehicles people use to get to 
work.155 The one data point that is public is from an internal 
survey of TitleMax customers, which found that “[a]pproximately 
70% of our customers own two or more vehicles.”156 However, 
TitleMax has only released the conclusions of its survey, not any of 
the underlying methodology or data. Thus, this central question of 
title lending policy remains entirely unaddressed.157 
                                                                                                     
 152. Lynch Press Release, supra note 72.  
 153. Doyle’s Veto Pen Is a Sword for Consumers, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, 
Wis.), May 26, 2010, at 29. For an explanation of how the governor outlawed 
title lending through his veto power, see Auto Title Lenders Decry Doyle Veto, 
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, May 19, 2010 (“Doyle on Tuesday used his partial veto 
power to cross out parts of several sections to create a new sentence declaring, 
‘No licensed lender may make a title loan.’”). 
 154. Press Release, Zepnick Proposes Consumer Lending Reforms, WIS. 
POLIT., July 24, 2009, available at http://www.wispolitics.com/1006/090305_ 
Payday_Lending.pdf. 
 155. See, e.g., NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Leslie Parrish). 
 156. TMX Finance, supra note 11, at 43. 
 157. Another important policy question that needs research is whether most 
of the cars that lenders repossess actually work. Title lenders claim that most 
vehicles they repossess are essentially worthless. See, e.g., Davis & Davis 
Interview, supra note 24 (estimating 90% of the vehicles TDJ Financial 
repossesses are worthless); Zywicki, supra note 3, at 455 (“[M]any of these cars 
have mechanical failures or other damage that makes it not worthwhile to 
expend the cost of repossession.”); Locker, supra note 122 (“[The] vice president 
of Atlanta-based Community Loans of America . . . said . . . that some customers 
who default have cars so worthless that they tell lenders to come get them.”). It 
is important to know whether the repossessed vehicles still function because, if 
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In my survey, I asked, “Considering only people living in your 
same house, how many working vehicles does your family have?” 
Among those we surveyed, 20% (n = 7) had only one vehicle in 
their household. The remaining 80% had two or more vehicles, 
with the modal number (representing 62.86% of surveys) being two 
vehicles. If these results were representative—I do not suggest 
they are—and the repossession rates presented in Part II.C.1 were 
representative, then the number of people losing their only way to 
work is small: around 2%. Because of the limitations on the data I 
acquired, this remains a question of central importance for title 
lending policy. My findings, however, cast doubt on the oft-
repeated claim that title lending results in customers being unable 
to get to work.  
States have had to craft regulatory policy for title lending 
despite the uncertainties that surround the fundamentals of this 
business. The next Part explains how different states have 
responded to title lending. 
III. Title Lending Law 
Several well-known federal laws govern title lending. One is 
the Truth in Lending Act, which, among other things, requires 
that title lenders disclose the cost of loans as an APR.158 Another is 
the Talent-Nelson Amendment, which essentially forbids title 
loans to members of the armed service.159 More recently, the new 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
forbids lenders from engaging “in any unfair, deceptive, or abusive 
act or practice,” and empowers the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection to develop regulations for title lenders.160 
                                                                                                     
most do not, the claim that people are losing a means of transportation is 
obviously false. But it is hard to believe that lenders would spend the money to 
repossess nonfunctioning cars, suggesting people are losing a means of 
transportation. 
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 1664 (2006). 
 159. 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006).  
 160. Consumer Financial Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act of 2010 § 1036, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 2010 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5536). For a more 
extensive discussion of the importance of the Act for fringe creditors, see Jim 
Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 23 
(2011).  
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Less explored and recognized are state statutes regulating 
title lending. States have adopted a wide variety of methods for 
regulating title lending. These cover an enormous range, from 
banning the transaction to formally authorizing it with very few 
restrictions. This Part categorizes current regulatory approaches 
and analyzes these disparate schemes and their relationship to 
other laws not specifically governing title lending.  
Creating categories of different state regulations is significant 
because, while other articles have discussed title lending law 
generally,161 no other articles have established such a taxonomy of 
existing title lending laws. Creating a taxonomy allows us to see 
the options available to regulators when confronting the problems 
and the opportunities created by title lending. This Part sets the 
groundwork for Part IV, which evaluates these different 
approaches. 
A. Effective Bans 
Although federal legislation has been introduced in an 
attempt to ban title loans across the nation,162 it is difficult to find 
any states that explicitly ban title lending. However, a strong 
majority of states effectively ban title lending by setting usury 
rates low enough that no one will offer title loans within their 
borders. Alaska provides one of many examples.163 Alaska has a 
small loan law that applies for any loan under $25,000.164 The 
statute caps loans under $25,000 at a maximum of 3% a month,165 
which works out to roughly 42.5% APR. No statute in Alaska 
                                                                                                     
 161. See Zywicki, supra note 3, at 434–35 (summarizing state laws at a high 
level); Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 54–56 (discussing several individual 
state statutes without placing them into a broad conceptual framework). 
 162. A federal ban on auto title lending was introduced by Arizona 
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. See Press Release, Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, 
U.S. Rep. Gabrielle Giffords Acts to Ban Payday Lending Nationwide (June 30, 
2010), available at http://www.votesmart.org/public-statement/526382/us-rep-
gabrielle-giffords-acts-to-ban-payday-lending-nationwide. The text of the bill is 
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-5689. 
 163. For a few other examples, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-201(2)(a)(I) (2010) 
(capping loans under $1,000 at 36% APR); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 41a(b)(4) 
(West 2011) (capping loans secured by vehicles at 20% APR). 
 164. ALASKA STAT. §§ 06.20.010–.920 (2010). 
 165. Id. § 06.20.230(a). 
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explicitly exempts title lenders from this cap,166 and Alaska does 
not allow title lenders to offer title loans structured as open-ended 
credit agreements to evade the cap.167 Thus, if a business wants to 
make a title loan, it is subject to the 42.5% APR cap.  
Title lenders refuse to offer title loans at 40% APR, so this rate 
cap effectively bans title lenders from Alaska and other states with 
similar laws. As one example, EZCORP’s annual report explains 
that its stores do not lend to active duty military personnel 
because the federal government caps the interest rate on such 
loans at 36%.168 Evidence from states enacting interest-rate caps 
on payday loans after allowing higher rates makes it plain that 
lenders will not continue offering loans in these environments.169 
One consumer advocate has found that title lenders will generally 
only operate if they are permitted to charge above 200% APR.170 
Thus, when states enact caps at lower amounts, the effect is a 
complete ban.171 
                                                                                                     
 166. Alaska does exempt pawnbrokers from this statute, so it is possible 
that a business could make a title loan as a pawnbroker for less than $500. See 
id. § 06.20.330(b) (“This chapter does not apply to individual loans by 
pawnbrokers . . . or loan shops where separate and individual loans do not 
exceed $500.”). 
 167. See id. § 06.20.285(a) (“A licensee may make open-end loans not 
exceeding an aggregate total of $25,000 and may contract for and receive 
interest on open-end loans as provided in AS 06.20.230 [setting 3% monthly rate 
maximums], and for other charges permitted under this chapter.”). 
 168. See EZCORP, Inc., supra note 31, at 14 (“This 36% annual percentage 
rate cap applies to a variety of loan products, including signature loans, though 
it does not apply to pawn loans. We do not make signature loans to active duty 
military personnel . . . because it is not economically feasible for us to do so at 
these rates.”). 
 169. Zywicki uses a report from Policis, THE EFFECT OF INTEREST RATE 
CONTROLS IN OTHER COUNTRIES 16 (Policis 2004), to make the point that after 
Florida capped interest rates for title loans at 30%, “the number of auto title 
lenders operating in the state dropped from 600 before the legislation was 
enacted to 58 the year following.” Zywicki, supra note 3, at 432 n.17. 
 170. See NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Leslie Parrish). 
 171. Indeed, a consumer advocate recently pointed out that one of the best 
ways to ban title lending is to place a cap on interest rates. See id. (remarks of 
Jay Speer). 
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B. Title Lenders Operating in States with Strict Price Controls 
Despite the fact that interest rate caps should effectively ban 
title lenders from offering loans in a state, it is very difficult to 
determine whether any given interest rate ceiling is effective in 
preventing title lending. The National Consumer Law Center 
produced a “Scorecard” on small-dollar loan products in 2010 that 
lists which states prohibit title loans or set interest rates below 
36%.172 The Scorecard reports that thirty states fall within this 
category and should therefore have no title lenders.173 Twenty 
states permit rates above 36%, but only seventeen permit rates 
above 200%,174 the rate generally required to allow title lending to 
exist.175 Yet, the American Association of Responsible Auto 
Lenders reports that its members alone operate in twenty-two 
states,176 so determining which states effectively ban title lending 
is not as simple as merely looking at usury caps. 
There are several states that have rate caps that should 
prevent title lending but fail to do so because title lenders use 
creative legal moves to avoid the rate cap. Lenders have avoided 
caps in Kansas by offering loans as open-ended credit 
arrangements, in Texas by operating as Credit Service 
Organizations, and in California by offering loans at amounts just 
above the amount covered by the rate cap. The following sections 
explain how these transactions work despite laws that appear to 
effectively ban them. In some cases, lenders operate in the midst of 
uncertainty, realizing that courts may vitiate their loophole 
through a different interpretation of the law enabling their 
creative practice. 
                                                                                                     
 172. See LEAH A. PUCKETT ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., SMALL DOLLAR 
LOAN PRODUCTS SCORECARD—UPDATED 14–20 (May 2010), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/cu-small-
dollar-scorecard-2010.pdf.  
 173. Id. at 14–20. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Leslie Parrish).  
 176. Am. Assoc. of Responsible Auto Lenders, About the AARAL, 
http://www.responsibleautolenders.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
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1. Open-Ended Credit 
Kansas is a state with a 36% interest rate cap,177 but it has 
active title lending within its borders.178 To avoid the cap and 
operate within Kansas, lenders structure title loans in Kansas as 
open-ended credit arrangements. In an open-ended credit plan, 
like those used by credit card companies, the lender sets a credit 
limit, and the borrower can access any amount of money within 
that limit over a period of time, pay it off, and access it again, and 
the lender only charges a finance charge on the actual amount 
borrowed.179 Title lenders in Kansas structure loans just like credit 
cards. One advertisement explains, “The title loan is an open-end 
line of credit that can be used as needed and paid back in full at 
any time . . . .”180  
Unlike normal loans, Kansas exempts open-ended credit from 
any cap: “For any consumer loan incurred pursuant to open end 
credit, including, without limitation, a loan pursuant to a lender 
credit card, a lender may charge a finance charge at any rate 
agreed to by the parties . . . .”181 By simply restructuring the 
transaction, title lenders obviate the rate cap.  
Lenders in Kansas are not alone in this practice. Up until 
recently, Virginia’s Finance Act182 had a similar loophole that 
resulted in title lenders offering open-ended credit plans.183 
                                                                                                     
 177. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-401(2) (2009) 
For any consumer loan incurred pursuant to closed end credit, a 
lender may charge a periodic finance charge, calculated accordingly to 
the actuarial method, not to exceed: (a) 36% per annum on the portion 
of the unpaid balance which is $860 or less, and (b) 21% per annum 
on the portion of the unpaid balance which exceeds $860 . . . . 
 178. See, e.g., Speedy Cash, Kansas Store Locations, http://www.speedycash. 
com/payday-loans/kansas/locations/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Speedy Cash, Auto Equity Loans, 
http://www.speedycash.com/auto-equity-loans/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 179. For a legal definition, see Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1602(i) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(20) (2010). 
 180. Speedy Cash, Auto Equity Loans, http://www.speedycash.com/auto-
equity-loans/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 181. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-401(1) (2009). 
 182. VA. CODE ANN. tit. 15-2, subtit. II, ch. 26 (West 2011). 
 183. See Attorney General Files Lawsuit Against Local Auto Title Dealer, 
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Similarly, reports indicate lenders in Iowa operated this way as 
well.184 Finally, lenders hoping to avoid the 36% rate cap on loans 
to military personnel are now offering open-ended “payday 
advances.”185 
2. Credit Service Organizations 
Title lenders operating in Texas face a similar interest rate 
cap of 30% for loans under $1,800.186 Instead of offering loans 
directly to borrowers and thus being subject to this cap, most 
lenders operate as Credit Service Organizations (CSOs). A CSO is 
defined in the Texas Finance Code as a person who provides 
services to improve a consumer’s credit history or rating or to 
obtain an extension of consumer credit for a consumer.187 The 
statute does not limit the fees a CSO can charge for these 
services.188  
The purpose of this CSO statute was to protect consumers 
from fraud when they employ credit repair organizations to fix 
distressed credit.189 The language of the statute defining the 
organizations that repair credit, however, is very broad, including 
in the definition of a CSO a person who obtains an extension of 
                                                                                                     
DAILY PRESS (Hampton Roads, Va.), May 19, 2010, available at 
http://articles.dailypress.com/2010-05-19/news/dp-nws-cash-lawsuit-20100518_1 
_open-end-credit-loans-subject-borrowers (explaining that Virginia title lenders 
are subject to the state’s 12% rate cap if they do not offer credit as an open-
ended credit plan). 
 184. See, e.g., Kirchhoff, supra note 122. 
 185. See DoD Shares Loan Blame, AIR FORCE TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at 4 
(“But blame the Pentagon [for] limiting the law’s protections to just . . . payday 
loans, vehicle title loans and refund anticipation loans.  These ‘advances,’ on the 
other hand, qualify as ‘open-ended lines of credit,’ a definition that allows the 
banks to completely ignore the law’s 36 percent interest rate cap.”). 
 186. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.201 (West 2009). 
 187. Id. § 393.001. 
 188. Id. §§ 393.001–.628.  
 189. See Letter from Kymberly K. Oltrogge, Ass’t Att’y Gen., to Hon. Mark 
W. Stiles, Chair of Calendars Comm. (Mar. 24, 1994), available at 
http://ww.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/lo48morales/lo94-029.txt; see also Eugene J. 
Kelley, Jr. et al., The Credit Repair Organization Act: The “Next Big Thing?”, 57 
CON. FIN. L.Q. 49, 56 (2003) (reporting that states enacted CSO statutes to 
regulate entities that attempt to improve a consumer’s credit rating). 
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consumer credit by another for the consumer.190 The Attorney 
General of Texas191 and the Fifth Circuit192 have both opined that 
companies acting as CSOs are not bound by state usury limits on 
loan fees.  
EZCORP’s Annual Report summarizes how EZCORP 
generates fees as a CSO: 
In our Texas stores, we do not offer signature loan or auto title 
loan products themselves, but offer fee-based credit services to 
customers seeking loans. In these locations, we act as a credit 
services organization (or “CSO”) on behalf of customers in 
accordance with applicable state laws, and offer advice and 
assistance to customers in obtaining loans from unaffiliated 
lenders. Our services include arranging loans with independent 
third-party lenders, assisting in the preparation of loan 
applications and loan documents, and accepting loan payments 
for the lenders. We do not make, fund or participate in the loans 
made by the lenders, but we assist customers in obtaining credit 
and enhance their creditworthiness by issuing a letter of credit 
to guarantee the customer’s payment obligations to the 
independent third-party lender.193 
The Texas legislature recently changed the CSO law to 
specifically address title lenders and payday lenders who operate 
as CSOs,194 but for years, the CSO model of operation allowed 
lenders in Texas to operate with few substantive restrictions in a 
state with a strict usury law.  
3. Higher Loan Amounts 
A final way title lenders have avoided rate caps is by offering 
loans at amounts just above the rate cap. In California, small loans 
                                                                                                     
 190. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 393.001(3) (West 2009). 
 191. See Letter from Barry R. McBee, First Ass’t. Att’y Gen., to Leslie 
Pettijohn, Comm’r, Office of the Consumer Credit Comm. (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 192. See Lovick v. Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 442–43 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 193. EZCORP, Inc., supra note 31, at 6; see also Mary Spector, Taming the 
Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and Unintended Consequences, 57 
DEPAUL L. REV. 961, 983–95 (2008). 
 194. See H.B. 2592, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (requiring payday and 
title lenders to make certain disclosures); see also H.B. 2594, 82nd Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Tex. 2011) (requiring payday and title lenders to be licensed by the state). 
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are capped at 2.5%, but loans over $2,500 are not covered by the 
cap.195 Thus, title lenders offer loans for $2,501 at any rate they 
agree on with the borrower.196 
One predictable effect of avoiding the rate cap by offering 
higher loan amounts is that more loans are undersecured. Given 
that, in other states, lenders’ loan averages are less than $1,000, 
setting $2,500 as a minimum loan amount either drives many 
customers out of the title lending market or drives lenders to offer 
higher percentages of the value of the vehicle, which in turn likely 
leads to more lenders seeking deficiency judgments from borrowers 
who default. California offers an example of lawmakers choosing a 
side in the debate over whether consumers are better off with 
higher loan amounts, even if they did so unintentionally. 
C. Authorized but Effectively Unregulated 
In several states, title lenders do not operate with legal 
uncertainty from obviating usury laws or operate under the weight 
of significant regulation because the states explicitly authorize 
title lending without any significant regulation. For instance, 
Arizona has a statute that authorizes title lending by recognizing 
the different forms the loan can take as legal transactions.197 The 
                                                                                                     
 195. CAL. FIN. CODE § 22303 (2009). 
 196. See Fast Auto & Payday Loans, Fast Auto and Payday Loans, Inc. Is 
Helping People Just Like You Get the Extra Cash You Need, 
http://www.clacal.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“Need a California title loan? 
$2,501 to $10,000 Available Now!”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Similarly, in Illinois, title lenders began offering sixty-one-day loans 
when the legislature attempted to regulate title loans by passing a statute 
covering loans under sixty days. See Stephen Franklin, Loophole Lets Lender 
Skirt Law, Group Says, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25, 2008, at B1, available at 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-04-25/business/0804241039_1_payday-
loans-cash-strapped-borrowers-annual-interest (suggesting that circumvention 
of loan term limits is “not new” to Illinois lenders).  
 197. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-281(13) (2010). The statute governs 
“secondary motor vehicle finance transactions.”  The definition in the statute 
reveals that it regulates title lending because it includes both traditional title 
lending and the sale-leaseback agreements some lenders employ:  
“Secondary motor vehicle finance transaction”  
(a) Means any contract that includes provisions for either: 
(i) Obtaining a security interest in or lien on a motor vehicle other 
than in connection with the sale of that motor vehicle.  
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only specific regulation of these loans, however, is a relatively high 
limit on the monthly interest rates lenders may charge borrowers, 
ranging from 17% per month (which is around 205% annually) for 
loans under $500 to 10% per month (which is 120% annually) for 
loans over $5,000.198 Otherwise, the U.C.C. governs these loans as 
secured transactions.199 
Other states authorize title lending in a slightly less direct 
form by simply authorizing small loans, which capture almost all 
title loans, but not placing any restrictions on the interest rate for 
these loans. New Mexico, as an example, authorizes small-dollar 
loans through a specific statute,200 and even makes it a violation of 
the small-loan statute to charge a usurious rate based on other 
state law.201 However, the small-loan statute does not have a usury 
cap,202 and the state does not have a general usury cap.203 The only 
provisions governing title loans are the generic ones in the U.C.C. 
                                                                                                     
(ii) The sale or conditional sale of a motor vehicle and the seller’s 
right to retain use of the motor vehicle after the sale or conditional 
sale.  
(b) Includes any conditional sales contract or contract for the 
bailment or leasing of a motor vehicle in which the bailee or lessee 
agrees to pay for use of the motor vehicle and the bailee or lessee is 
required to become or has the option of becoming the owner of the 
vehicle for any or no compensation.  
Id. 
 198. Id. § 44-291(G). 
 199. See generally U.C.C. art. 9 (1977). 
 200. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-15-1 to -39 (2010). 
 201. Id. § 58-15-23. 
 202. See id. §§ 58-15-1 to -39. 
 203. Section 56-8-3 states that interest rates, “in the absence of a written 
contract fixing a different rate, shall be not more than fifteen percent annually,” 
but it does not restrict the rate of interest if the parties agree to one in a written 
contract. In a similar context, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that a 
statute like this one does not cap interest rates. See Superior Concrete Pumping 
Inc. v. David Montoya Constr., Inc., 773 P.2d 346, 348–49 (N.M. 1989) (holding 
that the default interest rate set out in New Mexico’s statute governing the 
unpaid balance of an open account was not a cap on interest rates if the parties 
agreed on a higher rate).  
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D. Regulated as a Pawn Transaction 
Some states regulate title loans as pawn transactions, 
affording title borrowers the same rights as pawn customers. But 
determining whether a state’s pawn brokering laws apply to title 
lending is sometimes difficult. Some states specifically include title 
lending under pawn laws. The Georgia legislature specifically 
defines “pledged goods,” the item covered by the pawn law, as 
including automobile certificates of title:  
“Pledged goods” means tangible personal property, including, 
without limitation, all types of motor vehicles or any motor 
vehicle certificate of title, which property is purchased by, 
deposited with, or otherwise actually delivered into the 
possession of a pawnbroker in connection with a pawn 
transaction.204  
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Maine specifically states 
that title lending is not within the pawn-brokering statute. The 
items covered by Maine’s pawn law include “motor vehicles, but 
do[] not include documents evidencing title to motor vehicles.”205 
Similarly, Louisiana limits pawnbrokers to accepting vehicles as 
collateral only if they physically possess the vehicle, and the 
statute explicitly states: “Under no circumstances shall the 
practice commonly referred to as motor vehicle ‘title only’ pawn 
transactions be allowed in this state.”206  
In the middle lie states where the statute itself does not make 
it clear whether title loans come within the definition of pawn 
transactions. In Alabama, for instance, it does not appear that title 
loans fall within the definition of pawn transactions because title 
lenders do not retain possession of the vehicles and the statute 
defines a pawn transaction as “[a]ny loan on the security of 
pledged goods or any purchase of pledged goods on condition that 
the pledged goods are left with the pawnbroker and may be 
redeemed or repurchased by the seller for a fixed price within a 
fixed period of time.”207 Yet, the Alabama Supreme Court has ruled 
                                                                                                     
 204. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-130(5) (2010). 
 205. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 3960(3) (2009). Thus, title loans are not 
exempt from Maine’s usury statute, id. tit. 9-A, § 2-401, despite the fact that 
pawn transactions avoid the rate cap, id. tit. 30-A § 3963(1). 
 206. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1801(D) (2010). 
 207. ALA. CODE § 5-19A-2(3) (2010). 
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that a certificate of title held by a lender counts as a “pledged 
good,” making title loans subject to pawn transaction rules.208  
The courts have provided certainty that Alabama’s pawn laws 
apply to title lenders, but this finding is unique among the states 
that have similarly vague definitions of pawned goods. Other 
courts have found title lenders are violating usury statutes by 
guessing incorrectly that title loans are governed by pawnshop 
laws.209 
When title loans are governed by pawn laws, a series of 
common provisions usually apply:210 the law forbids lenders from 
seeking deficiencies and does not require them to pay surpluses;211 
loan terms are set at thirty days;212 interest rates are sometimes 
capped, but the cap is set at a high amount;213 and lenders must 
wait for a set period after default before they may sell the 
collateral.214 
                                                                                                     
 208. Floyd v. Title Exch. & Pawn, Inc., 620 So. 2d 576, 579 (Ala. 1993). 
 209. In Chandler v. Kentucky Title Loan, Inc., 16 S.W.3d 312 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1999), the court found a title lender was not a pawnbroker under Kentucky law 
because “we find a significant difference between the Kentucky and Alabama 
statutes with respect to the breadth of the definition of a pawn transaction.” Id. 
at 314. Because it was not a pawn transaction, “it was not exempt from 
application of KRS Chapter 288 and it operated its business in violation of [the 
statute].” Id. at 315. 
 210. Carrie Teegardin, Title Loan’s Price High, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Jan. 25, 2009, available at http://www.ajc.com/ajccars/ 
content/printedition/2009/01/25/titlepawn0125.html (“[T]he fact that the 
transaction is technically a pawn means the money comes with the same risks 
and benefits of taking a diamond ring or stereo to a pawnshop . . . . Lenders can 
sell repossessed cars and retain the entire proceeds . . . even if those far exceed 
the balance on the loan.”). 
 211. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-19A-6 (2011). 
 212. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-131(a)(1) (2011). 
 213. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-19A-7(a) (2011) (setting a 25% per month 
interest rate cap); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-131(a)(4)(A) (2011) (same). 
 214. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-19A-5(c) (2011) (“All goods purchased by the 
pawnbroker except for automobiles, trucks, and similar vehicles shall be 
maintained on the premises . . . at least fifteen business days before the goods 
may be offered for resale. Automobiles, trucks, and similar vehicles shall be 
maintained on the premises for 21 calendar days.”); id. § 5-19A-4(1) (“Any 
personal property pledged to a pawnbroker within this state is subject to sale or 
disposal when there has been no payment made on the account for a period of 30 
days past maturity date of the original contract, and no further notice is 
necessary.”); id. § 5-19A-10(b) (“Pledged goods not redeemed on or before the 
maturity date if fixed and set out in the pawn ticket issued in connection with 
any transaction shall be held by the pawnbroker for 30 days following that 
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In addition to these common pawn law provisions, Georgia has 
added a series of provisions specifically directed at auto title loans 
that do not apply to other pawn transactions.215 These laws appear 
to supplement the standard pawn statute with provisions that are 
important to regulating transactions where the debtor retains 
possession of the collateral. For instance, Georgia prohibits sale-
leaseback agreements,216 transactions that only arise if the debtor 
retains possession of the collateral (since possession is the major 
right granted in leasing a good). Additionally, Georgia’s statute 
gives lenders the right to take possession of vehicles upon default 
without judicial approval if the lender can do so “without breach of 
the peace.”217 Finally, the statute outlines the charges a lender can 
levy if it takes possession of a vehicle218 and requires lenders to 
disclose these charges to borrowers.219 Because it specifically 
regulates title loans through these provisions, Georgia might also 
fit within the next categories of laws—laws that directly and 
extensively regulate title loans. 
E. Regulated Directly and Extensively (Although 
not Necessarily Strictly) 
Numerous states have laws that were specifically created to 
address title lending. This subpart outlines some of the common 
features of these laws, although individual states may have only 
some of these requirements. In addition, this subpart is not meant 
to be an exhaustive exploration of every provision of every state 
statute; instead, it attempts to highlight the provisions that are 
most controversial and most important.  
                                                                                                     
date . . . .”).  
 215. Similarly, Minnesota governs title loans with its pawn laws 
supplemented by some additional provisions specific to title loans. See MINN. 
STAT. § 325J.095 (2011). 
 216. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-131(a)(2) (2011). 
 217. Id. § 44-12-131(a)(3). 
 218. Id. § 44-12-131(a)(4)(C). 
 219. Id. §§ 44-12-138(3),(12)–(15). 
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1. Licensing Requirements 
A primary form of direct regulation of title lenders is licensing 
requirements.220 Tennessee’s law, for instance, voids any title loan 
made by an entity that is not licensed by the state.221 To obtain a 
license, a title lender must, among other requirements, (1) have net 
assets of $75,000 per location,222 (2) pay an $800 filing fee per 
location,223 (3) submit a balance sheet and income statement 
prepared by an unaffiliated certified public accountant,224 and 
(4) obtain a surety bond of $25,000 per location (not to exceed 
$200,000 per firm).225 In addition to requirements for obtaining a 
license, firms must report certain information to the state226 and 
make their records available for examination.227 
2. Rollovers 
Many states directly regulating title loans have laws 
addressing the issue of rollovers. Tennessee addresses rollovers by 
requiring that, after three rollovers, the lenders must begin 
reducing the principal owed on the loan.228 Other states specifically 
limit the number of times a customer can roll over a title loan.  
Some laws limiting rollovers likely have no real effect on the 
business practices of lenders. In Delaware, for instance, rollovers 
that extend a loan for more than 180 days are formally 
prohibited.229 This restriction, however, does not prevent borrowers 
from paying off a title loan after 180 days and then immediately 
taking out a new title loan from the same lender because “rollover” 
under the statute “means the extension of an outstanding and 
                                                                                                     
 220. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 5, § 2202 (2011); FLA. STAT. § 537.004 
(2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-503 (2011).  
 221. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-15-105 (2011). 
 222. Id. § 45-15-106(a)(1). 
 223. Id. § 45-15-106(d)(1).  
 224. Id. § 45-15-106(d)(2). 
 225. Id. § 45-15-106(d)(3). 
 226. Id. § 45-15-109. 
 227. Id. § 45-15-108. 
 228. Id. § 45-15-113(d). 
 229. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2254 (2011). 
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unpaid indebtedness beyond the originally stated repayment 
period.”230 
3. Repossessions 
States regulating title loans directly often provide rules for 
lenders attempting to gain possession of vehicles if the borrower 
defaults. Like Georgia,231 most states incorporate232—or at least do 
not displace233—U.C.C. Article 9’s requirement that secured lenders 
not breach the peace while gaining possession of a vehicle.234 
Illinois goes a few steps farther, requiring lenders to notify 
borrowers of their intention to take possession, afford “the obligor 
the opportunity to make the vehicle available to the lender at a 
place, date and time reasonably convenient to the lender and 
obligor” and permit the borrower “to remove any personal 
belongings from the vehicle without charge or additional cost.”235 
Other states forbid lenders from purchasing vehicles they have 
repossessed,236 despite the normal rule in secured transactions that 
permits lenders to purchase goods they have repossessed subject to 
some restrictions.237 
                                                                                                     
 230. Id. § 2202. For an analysis of this same issue in the payday loan 
context, see Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 855, 897–98 (2007).  
 231. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 232. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2259 (2011) (“A licensee may take 
possession of the motor vehicle that is used as security for a title loan only in 
accordance with procedures specified in part 6 (Default) of Article 9 (Uniform 
Commercial Code—Secured Transactions) of Title 6.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-
46-507(2) (2011) (“If the debtor does not cure the default within the ten (10) 
days, the title lender may proceed to exercise its rights under chapter 9, title 28, 
Idaho Code.”); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 38, § 110.140 (2011) (stating that lenders 
must follow all applicable provisions of the U.C.C.). 
 233. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.455(1) (2011). 
 234. U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2) (1977). 
 235. ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 38, § 110.390(b) (2011). 
 236. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-508(6) (2011). 
 237. U.C.C. § 9-610(c) (1977). 
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4. Deficiencies and Surpluses 
Most states that directly regulate title loans require lenders to 
pay any surpluses generated by sales of repossessed vehicles and 
prohibit lenders from seeking anything from borrowers beyond 
taking possession of the vehicle.238 Delaware’s statute provides a 
typical example of how the law is formulated: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the proceeds of a 
licensee’s sale of a motor vehicle that is used as security for a 
title loan shall satisfy all outstanding and unpaid indebtedness 
under that loan, and the borrower on that loan shall not be 
liable for any deficiency resulting from that sale. The licensee 
shall nevertheless still be required to pay the borrower any 
surplus arising from the sale of that motor vehicle as required 
by part 6 (Default) of Article 9 (Uniform Commercial Code—
Secured Transactions) of Title 6.239 
While some states permit lenders to seek payment if the borrower 
purposefully prevents the lender from repossessing the vehicle or 
damages the vehicle,240 others, like Delaware, even prevent 
personal liability in these cases.  
5. Restrictions on Loan Amounts 
Some states restrict the amount of money title lenders can 
lend to borrowers, but different states use different measuring 
sticks to set a cap on the loan amount. The simplest caps are fixed 
dollar amounts, usually $2,500, that apply to all title loans 
regardless of the vehicle serving as collateral, the borrower, or the 
purpose of the loan.241 A few cap the loans based on the value of 
                                                                                                     
 238. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-508(2) (2011) (prohibiting lender 
from seeking any deficiencies from borrower and requiring lender to pay surplus 
to borrower); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-411(1), (5) (2011) (same); MONT. CODE ANN., 
§§ 31-1-816(2)(i),-818(8) (2011) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. § 604A.455(1) (2011) 
(same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-413(5) (2011) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-15-
114(b)(2), 45-15-115(2) (2011)  (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-24-204 (2011) (same). 
 239. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2260 (2011). 
 240. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-508(2) (2011) (forbidding deficiencies 
except “where the debtor prevented repossession of the vehicle, damaged or 
committed or permitted waste on the vehicle or committed fraud”). 
 241. See ILL. ADM. CODE, tit. 38, § 110.370(a) (2011) (stating title loans 
cannot exceed $4,000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-415(f) (2011) (forbidding title 
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the vehicle, sometimes providing appraisal guides as a measuring 
tool.242 South Carolina’s statute provides one example: 
A lender may not make a short-term vehicle secured loan in a 
principal amount greater than the fair market retail value of 
the motor vehicle securing the loan, as determined by common 
industry appraisal guides. If the motor vehicle securing the loan 
is not listed in common appraisal guides, the lender shall use 
his best judgment to determine the value.243 
Finally, and perhaps of greatest interest, some states require 
that title lenders base the amount of the loan on the borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan. Several states have general language that 
requires lenders to assess “the ability of the customer seeking the 
title loan to repay the title loan, including the customer’s current 
and expected income, obligations and employment.”244 Some 
statutes make clear that determining the consumer’s ability to 
repay the loan does not require a formal credit check but can instead 
rely on the consumer’s reported income and obligations.245 Illinois’s 
statute is more simplistic and easy to apply, prohibiting any loans 
                                                                                                     
loans over $2,500); MO. REV. STAT. § 367.527(2) (2011) (prohibiting title loans 
over $5,000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-15-115 (3) (2011) (limiting title loans to 
$2,500). 
 242. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-24-202(c) (2010) (stating title lenders may 
not “extend a title loan that exceeds the fair market value of the vehicle 
securing the title loan”); IDAHO CODE § 28-46-508 (3) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 604A.450(1) (2010). 
 243. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-413(4) (2011). 
 244. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604A.450(2) (2011); see also ORS § 725.605 
(2010) (“A lender may not make a title loan to a consumer without forming a 
good faith belief that the consumer has the ability to repay the title loan.”); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 37-3-413(3) (2011) (“Before making a short-term vehicle secured 
loan, a lender shall form a good faith belief that the borrower has the ability to 
repay the loan, considering [various factors].”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-24-202(3)(d) 
(2011) (“[A lender] may not extend a title loan without regard to the ability of 
the person seeking the title loan to repay the title loan, including the person’s: 
(i) current and expected income; (ii) current obligations; and (iii) employment.”).  
 245. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-413(3) (2011) (stating the lender may comply by 
having the borrower sign a statement on a separate form “that the information 
the borrower has provided regarding employment, income, and expenses is true 
and correct and that, given the information, the borrower believes he has the 
ability to repay the loan”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-24-202(4) (2011) (stating that 
the requirement is met if the borrower “provides the title lender with a signed 
acknowledgment that: (a) the person has provided the title lender with true and 
correct information concerning the person’s income, obligations, and 
employment; and (b) the person has the ability to repay the title loan”). 
588 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535 (2012) 
that have a single payment that “exceeds 50% of the obligor’s gross 
monthly income.”246  
6. Restrictions on Fees 
Many states that directly regulate title lending set limits on 
the interest rates and other fees that lenders can charge.247 These 
interest rate caps vary from 18%248 or 30% per year249 to around 
206% a year250 or 304% a year.251 In addition to limits on interest 
rates, some statutes limit the amount lenders can charge for 
noninterest rate charges, such as the fees for dishonored checks252 
and the cost of recording a lien.253  
As this Part illustrates, states have taken a variety of 
approaches even within the framework of directly regulating title 
lending. In many states, the law is in flux or uncertain; Part IV 
aims to offer guidance to states that are considering changes in 
their approach.  
IV. Evaluating Title Lending Laws 
In light of the different regulatory models discussed in Part 
III, this Part argues that the best approach to regulating title 
lending is to enact laws or regulations aimed specifically at title 
loan transactions. I begin by assessing the case for banning title 
lending, concluding that while arguments based on cost may 
compel some to accept a ban, the case is difficult to make. On the 
other end of the spectrum, states that authorize title lending 
without any restrictions or regulate title lending as pawn 
                                                                                                     
 246. ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 38, §110.340(a) (2011). 
 247. Of course, some states, like Delaware, have no interest rate limits. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2250–2261 (2011). 
 248. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41a(b)(4) (2011). 
 249. See FLA. STAT. § 537.011(1) (2011).  
 250. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-291(g) (2011). 
 251. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-413(1) (2011).  
 252. See OR. REV. STAT. § 725.615(2)(a) (2011) (limiting fees for dishonored 
checks to $20). 
 253. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-817(2) (2011) (limiting charges for 
recording a lien to the actual costs to the lender). 
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transactions offer too little regulation to ensure meaningful 
protections for customers. Finally, this Part makes the case for 
industry-specific regulation and suggests laws that are important 
for policymakers to enforce to ensure a fair marketplace. 
A. The Argument for Banning Title Loans 
Bans or effective bans on title lending are a popular regulatory 
choice, but the justifications for these bans are not entirely clear. 
Based on the data in Part II, we know title-loan borrowers 
experience a relatively low rate of repossession, and we have no 
evidence that those who do lose vehicles are losing their own 
means of transportation. Moreover, in eliminating title loans, bans 
may undermine the useful functions title loans can have in 
funding small businesses or in helping borrowers with emergency 
needs. In light of the weaknesses in the most common arguments 
for a ban, the best argument opponents have for drastic 
intervention into title lending markets is to reign in the high cost 
of the loans. 
1. Title Lending’s Spurious Connection to Financial Distress 
The case for banning title lending would be strong if 
proponents of bans could demonstrate the negative externalities 
title lending generates by pushing borrowers into financial 
distress. In the states for which we have repossession rates, 
however, the vast majority of borrowers do not lose their vehicles—
ranging from over 99% of borrowers retaining their cars to, in only 
one year, around 87%.254 Of those who do lose their vehicles, many 
likely do not lose a functioning mode of transportation,255 so it is 
not clear that title lending is the real cause of the loss. Most 
importantly, there is little evidence of how many people lose the 
only vehicle in their household.256 
For those who do lose their vehicle to repossession, we know 
that many lose the equity they have in the vehicle because a lender 
                                                                                                     
 254. See supra Table 2. 
 255. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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can charge the costs of repossessing, storing, and selling it. But, in 
terms of absolute dollars, the losses are likely small because the 
average value of the collateral, and thus the possible equity the 
borrower has, is small.257 Moreover, this same problem of 
borrowers losing equity exists under Article 9 of the U.C.C., which 
also permits lenders to charge costs against the borrower.258 
Clearly then, the argument against title lending based solely on 
losses from repossession fees proves too much. At the very least, 
policymakers who have relied on repossession rates and academics’ 
fears that borrowers are losing their only vehicles should 
reconsider these positions in light of the new reports state 
regulators are generating, as well as the fact that no studies have 
demonstrated that people are losing their only way to work. 
2. Bans Prevent Beneficial Uses of Title Loans 
Bans are blunt instruments that eliminate beneficial uses of 
title lending along with harmful uses. Based on my small survey 
and surveys by the FDIC and a major title lender, some borrowers 
are using title loans to meet short-term emergency liquidity crises, 
and others use title loans to finance small business operations.259 
While it is true that some borrowers are simply delaying financial 
breakdown by using title loans for ordinary expenses, a ban also 
eliminates the loans for those customers using the product 
rationally. 
If borrowers cannot use title loans, some commentary suggests 
they will turn to other inferior forms of credit or will be denied 
access to credit altogether.260 The title lender survey I was 
provided seems to substantiate this view, as shown in Table 4. 
                                                                                                     
 257. See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
 258. See U.C.C. § 9-615(a)(1) (1977) (specifying that proceeds of sale of 
repossessed items are to be applied first to “reasonable expenses of retaking, 
holding, preparing for disposition, processing, and disposing” of the collateral).  
 259. See supra Table 1 (listing factors motivating borrowers to take out title 
loans).  
 260. Zywicki, supra note 3, at 427 (“If deprived access to title loans, many 
consumers would substitute less-preferred sources of credit or risk losing access 
to legal credit altogether.”). 
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Table 4: Borrowers’ Alternatives to Title Loan 




None 774 71.93% 
Credit Unions 93 8.64% 
Bank Loan 154 14.31% 
Credit card cash advance 94 8.73% 
Bounced Check 39 3.62% 
Pay Late Fee 189 17.57% 
Borrowed Money from 
Relatives/Friends 
67 6.23% 
Payday Loan 8 0.74% 
Sell car 2 0.19% 
Among the customers we surveyed in Houston, however, the 
majority of people said they would just do without if they did not 
have access to title loans.261 Table 5 summarizes these results. 
Table 5: What Houston Customers Would Do Without Title Loans 
Alternative Number Selecting 
Percentage of 
Customers Selecting 
Get a loan elsewhere 11 31.43% 
Sell car 3 8.57% 
Not borrow and do without loan 18 51.43% 
No answer 3 8.57% 
If later research were to show that these results are representative 
of title lending customers, they suggest that, for many customers, 
title lending is not an essential source of credit that will 
necessarily be replaced by an inferior choice. The survey does not 
reveal, however, what costs go along with forgoing a loan. But, if 
borrowers can avoid using loans, then title lending is a very 
expensive form of optional credit. More research is needed to 
attempt to assess what borrowers would do if states permitting 
title lending banned it. 
At the very least, any ban on title lending should recognize the 
useful social function title lending can serve for small businesses 
and should exempt businesses from the ban. Existing state and 
                                                                                                     
 261. If nothing else, the different results from the title lender’s survey and 
my survey highlight the importance of what choices the survey instrument gives 
respondents. I suggest future surveys always include “choose not to borrow” as 
an option for a question about alternatives to title lending. 
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federal statutes can act as examples of how to restrict only 
consumer uses of title loans. The Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act,262 for instance, only applies to consumer debt.263 The purpose 
of the debt is set at the time the transaction begins, and debt 
collectors are not bound by the Act’s rules if they are collecting 
business debt.264 Even those supporters of a ban on non-productive 
or abusive consumer uses for title loans should support productive 
business uses of the transaction. A ban on title loans could easily 
look to the borrower’s purpose in taking out the loan and exempt 
business purposes from the ban or rate cap.  
3. Price: The Best Case for Bans 
Several of the most powerful critiques of title lending are 
merely different ways of stating the simple argument that title 
loans are too expensive. For example, the argument that people 
roll their loans over repeatedly, paying only the interest fee, 
exhibits concern about the ultimate price of title loans. The 
critique of the structure of title loans as single lump sum payments 
really reflects a concern over the price borrowers pay for the loan, 
because the lump sum often requires multiple payments of fees. 
Because the high cost of title loans is well established, for 
those who are inclined to regulate the cost of services to lower-
income Americans, price is a powerful justification for banning 
title lending. It does not appear that an inexpensive form of this 
                                                                                                     
 262. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 91 Stat. 874 
(1977). 
 263. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (2006) (“The term ‘debt’ means any obligation 
or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in 
which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the 
transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”). 
Similarly, Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act defines “consumers” under the 
Act and exempts large businesses. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.45(4) (2011):  
“Consumer” means an individual, partnership, corporation, this state, 
or a subdivision or agency of this state who seeks or acquires by 
purchase or lease, any goods or services, except that the term does 
not include a business consumer that has assets of $25 million or 
more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with 
assets of  $25 million or more. 
 264. Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 
F.3d 872, 874–75 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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transaction is possible for the clientele currently served by title 
lenders, so banning is the only option to deal with this pricey 
product if the aim is to eliminate the cost. Especially for those 
regulators and academics who are sanguine about interference 
with personal decision-making, price seems to be the best 
justification for banning title lending. 
B. Title-Lending-Specific Laws Versus Pawn Laws and 
Regulatory Uncertainty 
Several states allow title lenders to operate by structuring the 
products to avoid usury limits or by squeezing into laws aimed at 
other products like pawn transactions, credit cards, or credit 
service organizations. These schemes present two problems for 
protecting consumers. First, for states where lenders are not 
clearly sanctioned, the legal uncertainty prevents a fully 
competitive marketplace. Second, laws that are not tailored to the 
title-lending transaction leave customers vulnerable to harm. 
1. Uncertainty 
When title lenders operate in states without explicit 
authorization, it creates uncertainty for these businesses because, 
at any time, a court may find a lender has violated the usury 
statute. Some states, such as Texas, have clearly indicated that 
title lenders can operate through laws not specifically tailored for 
them,265 and in those states, firms operate with confidence.266  
In states without case law holding that lenders can operate 
through other laws, however, the uncertainty is a barrier to 
entering the market to compete. For instance, until Virginia 
recently specifically authorized title lending (after years of lending 
by title lenders through an open-ended credit statute), TitleMax 
refused to operate in the state. When the law changed, TitleMax 
                                                                                                     
 265. Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 442, 444 (5th Cir. 2004).  
 266. See Don Baylor, Op-Ed, Loopholes Allow Loan Sharks to Prey on 
Hardworking Texans, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 16, 2007, at 9B 
(“Payday lending is big business in Texas. In 2003, workers took out 1.8 million 
payday loans.”).  
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began offering loans in Virginia.267 One consumer advocate in 
Virginia so believed in the power of uncertainty that he said 
keeping the law uncertain was the best strategy in the fight 
against title lenders.268  
Stock prices can reflect the deleterious effect of uncertainty on 
alternative financial service providers. Gary Rivlin describes the 
effects uncertainty had on the stock of Advance America, a large 
payday lender, when multiple bills in Congress and numerous 
states were introduced that would affect its business: “Advance 
America had earned $30 million in profits in the second half of 
2008, and then booked another $26 million in profits in the first 
quarter of 2009, yet its stock was down by more than 75 percent 
from its high because of uncertainty about the payday loan.”269 
This sort of uncertainty likely stymies growth. 
In addition to fewer firms offering loans in these states 
because of disincentives, it is possible that the companies offering 
loans in these states are those with the least to lose, because they 
are thinly capitalized and essentially judgment-proof. TitleMax’s 
refusal to operate in Virginia is instructive: As a large lender with 
substantial assets, it is subject to suit if it, for instance, wrongfully 
repossesses and sells a borrower’s vehicle. Thus, because 
uncertainty decreases the number of companies willing to do 
business in a state and may also result in lower-quality companies 
operating there, states should enact title-loan specific laws. 
                                                                                                     
 267. See TMX Finance, supra note 11, at F9 
On April 11, 2010, the state of Virginia passed a new law, the 
Virginia Motor Vehicle Title Loan, that eliminates the extension of 
credit under the Open-End Credit product and regulates a simple 
interest secured loan up to 12 months in term. The legislation 
requires all locations to be licensed through the Virginia Bureau of 
Financial Institutions. This new law includes a cap on interest rates, 
but the cap is higher than the rates currently charged by the 
Company. This new law became effective October 1, 2010 and allows 
the Company to expand in this state with a product that is now 
regulated by the Commissioner. 
 268. See NCLC Webinar, supra note 48 (remarks of Jay Speer). 
 269. GARY RIVLIN, BROKE, USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC.—HOW 
THE WORKING POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS 313–14 (2010). 
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2. States Without Title Lending Laws Do Not Adequately Protect 
Consumers 
When a state does not have a law governing title loans, Article 
9 of the U.C.C. applies to title loans as secured transactions, 
empowering lenders to sue borrowers for deficiency judgments. As 
Part II.B.2.b. argues, this ability to seek deficiencies likely only 
affects the borrowers with the least valuable vehicles because 
these vehicles will not have sufficient equity in them to cover the 
costs of repossession and resale. Because it fails to protect the 
customers who are likely to be the least advantaged from financial 
distress, Article 9 is not a good substitute for specifically tailored 
laws. 
A potentially powerful counter-argument against my view is 
that lenders do not seek many deficiency judgments, so this 
drawback is not significant. The legal power to do so, however, 
likely gives lenders leverage over borrowers who are afraid of 
being sued. Martin and Adams report that lenders in New Mexico 
routinely include the right to seek a deficiency in their loan 
agreements,270 suggesting that lenders believe this provision 
affects the borrower’s perception of the lender’s power. Even if a 
debtor is judgment-proof, the threat of a lawsuit may squeeze out 
additional payments.  
Title lenders operating in states governed by pawn laws are 
not allowed to seek deficiencies, but they are also not required to 
return surpluses to borrowers. These laws fail to protect those 
borrowers with more expensive vehicles. Some title loans are 
oversecured, as demonstrated by the $251,047 lenders returned to 
borrowers in Tennessee in 2008,271 for instance. Thus, the pawn 
laws’ failure to require surplus payments fails to protect a specific 
segment of title lending customers. 
C. Specific Features Legislators Should Consider 
Instead of banning title lending or requiring lenders to fit 
within existing credit laws, states should enact provisions 
                                                                                                     
 270. See Martin & Adams, supra note 3, at 78 (stating that all title loan 
contracts the authors reviewed allowed the lender to sue for deficiencies).  
 271. 2010 TENN. REPORT, supra note 38, at 8. 
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specifically tailored to title lending. This section outlines my 
tentative suggestions about what I believe are the most important 
features title loan laws should include. I argue that states should 
forbid lenders from seeking deficiencies, require lenders to provide 
surpluses, and require lenders to make disclosures aimed at 
overcoming customers’ overly optimistic assessments of the 
transactional risks. Also, it is important that any title lending law 
provide for flexibility that permits lenders to develop the product. 
On the other hand, I argue that caps on loan amounts and loan 
interest rates are likely to produce negative consequences. Yet, 
because several critical questions remain unanswered, my 
suggestions are cautious. 
1. Deficiencies and Surpluses 
As I have argued, laws allowing deficiencies probably hurt the 
least advantaged title-lending customers, so laws specifically 
aimed at title lending should account for this risk. In the real 
estate context, the purpose of anti-deficiency statutes is “to prevent 
the aggravation of an economic recession which would result if 
creditors lost their property and were also burdened with personal 
liability . . . .”272 Similarly, in this context, states should limit 
liability for those customers who likely have the most to lose.  
Forbidding lenders from seeking deficiencies will likely also 
have the effect of emphasizing to lenders the importance of 
considering the customer’s ability to repay, to ensure that 
borrowers do not default and leave the lender holding a loan for 
more than the value of the collateral. If lenders know they will not 
be able to obtain deficiencies or incentivize repayment with the 
threat of deficiencies, they should be inclined to make less risky 
loans.  
Finally, allowing lenders to pursue deficiencies may push 
consumers to stay in disadvantageous title loans for longer than 
they should. For some borrowers, defaulting on the title loan is a 
better outcome than continuing to pay high interest rates month 
after month. The cost of losing one’s car might be lower than the 
cost of keeping it. Allowing the lender to obtain a personal 
                                                                                                     
 272. 4 MILLER & STARR, CAL. REAL EST. § 10:214 (3d ed. 2011). 
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judgment against the borrower, however, decreases the likelihood 
the borrower will opt to default. As Andra C. Ghent and Marianna 
Kudlyak have demonstrated in the context of mortgages: 
“[A]llowing the lender recourse to assets other than the mortgaged 
property lowers the value of the default option and thus reduces 
the borrower’s incentive to default.”273  
The negative consequence from limits on deficiencies is that 
lenders may offer lower loan amounts to ensure the equity in the 
vehicle will pay both the principal amount and the costs of 
repossession.274 Requiring lenders to return any surplus from 
selling the vehicle mitigates the effect of smaller loans to some 
extent; thus, it is an important companion law (assuming U.C.C. 
Article 9’s analogous provision is displaced by the title lending 
law). If lenders have to return surpluses, borrowers will at least be 
protected to the extent their equity exceeds the costs of 
repossession. As Part II.B.2 makes clear, however, this protection 
is still minimal, so borrowers will suffer in states that forbid 
deficiencies by getting lower loan amounts. However, on balance, 
the prohibition’s protections probably outweigh the harms. 
One legislator has expressed concern over the requirement 
that lenders return surpluses because lenders are not protected 
when vehicles are not worth anything after repossession.275 The 
losses a lender might face, however, are adequately accounted for 
in the high interest rate on these loans, so requiring surpluses is 
                                                                                                     
 273. Andra C. Ghent & Marianna Kudlyak, Recourse and Residential 
Mortgage Default: Theory and Evidence from U.S. States 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank 
of Richmond, Working Paper No. 09-10, 2009), available at http://www. 
richmondfed.org/publications/research/working_papers/2009/pdf/wp09-10r.pdf. 
 274. See MILLER & STARR, supra note 272, § 10:214 (noting one purpose of 
anti-deficiency statutes is “to prevent an overvaluation of the security”). 
 275. See Title Pawn Industry Warns Legislation Could Hurt the Poor, 
ACCESS NORTH GEORGIA (Oct. 25, 2005), http://new.accessnorthga.com/ 
detail.php?n=136791&c=2 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012).  
Rep. James Mills, R-Gainesville, the House banking chairman, said 
it’s too early to say what the Legislature will do, but added he is 
having second thoughts about the bill he introduced requiring brokers 
to rebate any excess to consumers whose cars have been repossessed 
and sold. He said he’s learned that many of the repossessed cars are 
junk which do not even cover the cost of the pawn. “If you’re going to 
make them give back the excess, what about the times the vehicle is 
not worth the loan?” 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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not necessary to balance lenders’ losses. Moreover, it is unlikely 
that title lenders would exit a state simply due to a requirement 
that they return surpluses because some of the largest lenders 
already return surpluses even though not required by law.276 In a 
study of pawnbrokers, John Caskey found requiring pawnbrokers 
to turn over the surplus did not affect the number of pawnshops 
per million residents.277 
2. Disclosures Aimed at Optimism and Cost 
My limited survey found that the people we surveyed were 
overly optimistic about the risks that they would either roll their 
loans over multiple times or lose their vehicle. More evidence is 
needed to conclusively establish these claims, but I tentatively 
recommend that states enact disclosure laws aimed at combating 
over-optimism. Marianne Bertrand and Adair Morse have tested 
such disclosures in the context of payday lending rollovers and 
found that a disclosure informing payday lending customers about 
the average rollover rates “reduces the take-up of payday loans by 
about 11 percent in a 4-month window following exposure to the 
new information.”278 Similar measures could be tested or adopted 
for title-lending laws. Generally, firms tolerate disclosure 
requirements well,279 so they are unlikely to substantially decrease 
the number of firms competing for business in a state. 
Another tentative conclusion from my survey was that people 
did not understand the relative cost of title lending because only 
25% of the borrowers recognized that title loans were a lot more 
expensive than credit cards.280 Again, more research is required to 
understand generally how title-loan customers understand the cost 
of the transaction, but since price is usually the most important 
                                                                                                     
 276. See id. (reporting TitleMax returns surpluses to customers in Georgia 
even though the law does not require it). 
 277. See Prager, supra note 90, at 11 (discussing Caskey’s study). 
 278. Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive 
Biases and Payday Borrowing 1 (Univ. Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper 
No. 10-01, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1532213. 
 279. See Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 10 (“Industry best 
practices include additional, prominent disclosures that go beyond most state 
and federal requirements . . . .”).  
 280. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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term of a consumer contract, and the price is so high for title loans, 
requiring clear disclosures seems appropriate.  
The best disclosures would show the cost of borrowing per 
$100 borrowed, displayed on the windows of the store to foster 
price competition. Rules about stating loan cost as an APR281 
should be vigorously enforced because lenders should be able to 
train staff to discuss APRs. Because most title loans are for one-
month terms, it should be easier for title lenders to correctly 
calculate the APR on a title loan than it is for payday lenders, 
whose loan terms depend on the length of time until the borrower’s 
next payday.282 Since lenders appear to already compete for 
customers based on price,283 clear disclosures should be effective in 
optimizing competition in the market.  
3. Flexibility to Permit Innovation 
Some current title-lending laws restrict title lending to its 
traditional month-long structure.284 In Texas, however, lenders 
have had the freedom to create innovative alternatives to the 
traditional title loan. While such innovations have the potential to 
harm consumers, in Texas, it appears that the flexible CSO format 
has allowed some firms to develop a more consumer-friendly loan 
structure in which the title loan is a longer-term, amortizing loan. 
Unlike the traditional title loan that requires a lump sum payment 
after a short period, several companies in Texas offer loans that act 
much more like the ones envisioned by consumer advocates 
attempting to reform title lending.  
                                                                                                     
 281. See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17–226.18 (2012) (setting out Truth 
in Lending Act requirements for APR disclosures in consumer loans).  
 282. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 230, at 904 
Interest-rate disclosures are misleading because the amount of the 
fee charged generally does not depend on the number of days until 
the borrower’s payday. An interest-rate disclosure would suggest that 
the rate changes every day depending on which day in the pay cycle 
the borrower obtains the loan, when actually the cost is uniform 
throughout that cycle. This confusion does nothing to help consumers 
evaluate competing products. 
 283. See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text. 
 284. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-131(a) (2011) (limiting title loans to 
thirty-day terms).  
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Cash America, a large public company, has a product that 
exemplifies this approach. The company offers twelve- to twenty-
four-month loans that are fully amortized and are explicitly based 
on the customer’s credit score and ability to repay, along with the 
value of the vehicle.285 The cost of Cash America’s product is less 
than for normal title loans, closer to 110% APR.286 The company’s 
goal in creating this product was to reach a different demographic 
than the typical title loan consumer—customers more like 
mainstream borrowers who want a product more closely 
resembling a traditional loan.287  
Additionally, several smaller companies in Houston offer 
amortizing title loans with longer terms, but unlike Cash America, 
they do not do formal credit checks.288 Texas Title Loans, as one 
example, advertises: 
With our loans your contract length is 9 months. . . . With our 
loans a portion of each monthly payment is applied to your 
principal. . . . With [our competitors’] loans you have no ending 
contract date. With their loans no portion of your monthly 
payment goes to your principal. With their loans the only way to 
pay your loan off in full. YOU MUST PAY ENTIRE LOAN 
BALANCE IN ONE PAYMENT!289 
                                                                                                     
 285. Vaugh & Bourns Interview, supra note 52, at 2.  
 286. Id. at 4. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Are You Trapped in a 30-Day Loan?, THE LOAN DEPOT (Oct. 11, 2010, 
10:10 AM), http://www.yourloandepot.com/blog_entries/ai/Corporate-5/are-you-
trapped -in-a-30-day-loan.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (“WE CAN GET YOU 
OUT OF A 30-DAY LOAN AND SET YOU UP ON A TERM LOAN AND GIVE 
YOU UP TO 12 MONTHS TO PAYOFF!!”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Advantage Finance, LLC, Frequently Asked Questions—What is a 
Car Title Loan?, http://www.cartitleloanshouston.com/pages/faqs.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2012)  
THESE ARE INSTALLMENT LOANS. Portions of your 
monthly payment goes to principal and a portion of it goes to 
interest. If you make your monthly installment payments 
every month when due, your loan will be paid off at the end of 
the contract term. THESE LOANS ARE NOT INTEREST 
ONLY LOANS. . . . Depending on the loan amount, you can 
take up to 24 months to pay off the loan. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 289. Texas Title Loans, Welcome to Texas Title Loans! (June 29, 2011), 
http://txtitleloans.net/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
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Another lender, TJD Financial Services, offers amortizing loans for 
the specific purpose of keeping people out of the trap created by 
large balloon payments.290 Finally, one other small operator in 
Houston offers customers the choice of a traditional title loan or an 
installment plan.291  
Ideally, a statute specifically governing title loans would be 
flexible enough to bring innovative approaches within its domain. 
This would encourage firms to compete by offering better loans to 
customers, and it would restrain firms from developing products 
that violate the provisions in a title-lending-specific law that 
protect consumers from abuses. 
4. Caps on Loan Amounts 
Several states currently limit the amount that title lenders 
can give to customers, either by setting an absolute dollar limit or 
limiting the loan to some portion of the value of the collateral (as 
low as half the value of the vehicle).292  
Based on the data we have, I believe these caps on loan 
amounts are likely to have negative consequences for borrowers. 
The law should aim to incentivize lenders to loan the highest 
percentage of the vehicle’s value possible because then borrowers 
who lose a vehicle will lose the least amount of their equity. Loan 
caps put the risk of repossession on borrowers because they will 
                                                                                                     
and Lee Law Review). 
 290. See Davis & Davis Interview, supra note 24, at 1. 
 291. See Magnolia Loans, Title Loans, http://www.magnolia-loans.com/our-
services/loan-services/title-loans/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2012)  
Your title loan can be structured to fit your preference. If you need a 
cash advance for a short period of time and don’t want to make 
scheduled payments or commit to a long-term loan, a single payment 
plan might be right for you. On the other hand, if you like to have 
your payments scheduled so that you know your loan will be paid off 
after a certain number of payments, an installment plan is probably a 
better option. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For an example of a smaller 
company in Arizona that offers a choice between a balloon product and an 
amortizing product, see Cash-N-Go, Title Loans, How It Works, 
http://www.azcashngo.com/vehicle-title-loans-online-how-works.php (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 292. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text. 
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walk away from a repossession with no vehicle, less money from 
the loan, and probably no surplus because the equity cushion is 
likely consumed by repossession costs.293 
Moreover, caps on loan amounts do nothing to protect the 
poorest title-loan borrowers with inexpensive cars because lenders 
will still loan amounts under the loan cap to these borrowers.294 At 
best, loan caps protect wealthier title-loan customers by preventing 
loans on high value collateral. But it is unclear why regulators 
would focus their energy on this group. 
The concern with high loan amounts is that borrowers will get 
in over their heads because lenders will not carefully consider the 
customer’s ability to repay.295 Yet, loan caps based on dollar 
amounts are an inapt means of dealing with this problem. They 
only address mismatches at high levels of income, while exhibiting 
no concern for people who take out smaller loans (e.g., $2,000) but 
lack the means of repaying them. Loan caps based on the value of 
the collateral also ignore the income of the borrower, ensuring the 
lender is protected by not becoming overextended on the loan, but 
not protecting the borrower. Finally, loan caps focused on income 
do attempt to solve the problem of ensuring a borrower’s ability to 
repay the debt, but such caps may result in very small loans being 
made on valuable collateral as lenders attempt to comply with the 
law, leaving the borrower with lost equity if the lender ends up 
repossessing because something unexpected prevents repayment. 
The better solution is to encourage lenders to evaluate ability to 
repay through disallowing deficiencies. This approach does not 
prevent borrowers to get the highest loan amount for their vehicle 
as possible. It emphasizes lenders actually evaluating the 
borrower’s ability to pay instead of lenders attempting to 
demonstrate compliance with the law.  
                                                                                                     
 293. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Of course, if a state does not 
prevent deficiency claims, laws encouraging higher loan amounts might lead to 
lenders seeking personal judgments against borrowers. This is another reason to 
forbid deficiencies. 
 294. See, e.g., Anonymous Interview, supra note 24, at 9 (stating that 
Anonymous “believe[s] the consumer is in the best position to make th[e] 
decision” about the loan amount, so long as the amount does not exceed equity 
in the vehicle).  
 295. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  
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5. Caps on Prices 
Some states cap the cost of loans,296 and high interest rates 
are a concern to members of Congress.297 For those who are 
concerned about the cost of title loans but do not want to ban the 
transaction, price caps are a compelling compromise.  
Commentators predict, however, that capping the interest rate 
will result in lenders adjusting other aspects of the transaction. 
Zywicki has noted that “term re-pricing” is probably less likely in 
title lending because the loans are “very simple and very 
transparent loans with a small number of terms.”298  
In contrast to Zywicki, I think it is likely that lenders will 
alter the transaction to account for price caps. The key term in title 
loans other than price that lenders can adjust, even if other fees 
are prohibited or other fees are minimal, is the amount they lend 
to borrowers. If title lenders are constrained in what they can 
charge, they may lend less money to take on less risk from the 
transaction. If this occurs, putting a price cap on rates results in 
borrowers who lose their car forfeiting more money. That these 
borrowers lose the equity they have amassed in the vehicle is a 
significant negative for the borrowers who are left worse off from 
title loans, so policymakers should avoid setting price terms which 
may decrease loan amounts. 
                                                                                                     
 296. See supra notes 247–53 (listing states with interest rate and fee 
restrictions). 
 297. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S5346-01 (daily ed. May 12, 2009) (statement 
of Sen. Durbin) 
[Y]ou would have to be out of your head to get into that kind of a 
predicament—a 36-percent annual interest rate. But the fact is 
Americans right and left are paying much higher interest rates today 
and don’t know it-payday loans, title loans, installment loans. . . . [I]t 
is about time we got real here. If we are not going to protect the 
American consumers when it comes to some of these interest rates, 
they are going to be very vulnerable to some bad practices.  
See also 146 CONG. REC. H5179-02 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. 
Roukema) (“Abuses in title loans and title pawn transactions often include 
excessively high interest rates and other exploitive lending practices.”). 
 298. Zywicki, supra note 3, at 430. 
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V. Conclusion 
A lot of questions about title lending remain unanswered. Are 
borrowers overly optimistic about the potential their vehicle will be 
repossessed or about the likelihood they will repeatedly roll over 
their loan? Do borrowers have other means of getting to work and 
doctors’ appointments other than the cars they put up as collateral 
for title loans? Do customers understand the relative cost of title 
loans? 
This Article has offered some preliminary evidence of many of 
the contested questions involved in title lending by using data from 
state regulators, public filings, interviews with title lenders, and 
customer surveys. Based on these data, I argue that states should 
enact laws specifically directed at title lending that preserve the 
equity borrowers have in their vehicles.  
It is clear that a lot of work remains to be done before 
policymakers have the information they need to effectively 
regulate title lending. Designing a strategy to survey title loan 
customers involves challenges because title lending stores are not 
generally very busy. Many of the answers to contested empirical 
questions will require a research approach that elicits information 
from the people the policies are being designed to protect—title-
lending customers. 
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Appendix A 
Survey on Auto Title Lending 
Contact: Asst. Professor Jim Hawkins, 713-743-5018 
Please circle your answer: 
1. Why did you take out this auto title loan? 
A. For personal expenses (such as paying bills, getting gas to 
drive to work, etc.) 
B. For business expenses (anything related to running your own 
business) 
C. For both personal and business expenses 
2. Considering only people living in your same house, how many 
working vehicles does your family have?  ____ 
3. How many months total do you anticipate it taking you to 
completely pay off this loan (after all renewals/rollovers)? 
1  7  More than 12 
2  8  
3  9 
4  10 
5  11 
6  12 
4. If you couldn’t pay off all your bills one month, which bills 
would you NOT pay so you could pay on this loan? (Check ALL 
that apply.) 
___ Rent or mortgage payment 
___ Utilities (water, electricity, etc.) 
___ Credit card debt  
___ Groceries 
___ Medical 
___ Other: _______________________________________________________ 
5. Why did you pick this lender? (Check all that apply.) 
___ Price 
___ Loan amount 
___ Location 
___ Referral from someone 
___ Lender’s reputation 
___ Have used this lender previously 
___ Other:________________________________________________________ 
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6. What do you think is the percentage chance the lender will 
repossess your vehicle?  ____% 
7. How does the cost of this title loan compare to the cost of a 
credit card? 
A. This title loan is a lot less expensive 
B. This title loan is a little less expensive 
C. They are about the same 
D. This title loan is a little more expensive 
E. This title loan is a lot more expensive. 
8. Is the loan you actually took out more money or less money 
than the loan you were originally wanting to get before you came 
to the title lending store? 
A. I got less money than I had originally wanted. 
B. I got more money than I had originally wanted. 
C. I got the same amount as I wanted before I came to the lender. 
9. How long have you had your loan? 
A. I took my loan out today. 
B. I have had my loan out ___ months.  
10. If you could not get a title loan, what would you do? 
A. Get a loan from somewhere else like friends, family, a pawnshop, 
or another lender. 
B. Sell my car. 
C. Not borrow any money and just make do without a loan. 
D. Other: 
________________________________________________________ 
